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SHOULD MAINE SHIP ITS LOW-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE TO TEXAS? A
CRITICAL LOOK AT THE TEXAS LOWLEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
DISPOSAL COMPACT
I.

INTRODUCrION

The Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact is an
agreement, made at the behest of federal legislation and currently
awaiting ratification by the United States Congress, that would allow Maine and Vermont to ship low-level radioactive waste to the
state of Texas, where it would be disposed of in a facility to be constructed near the small town of Sierra Blanca.' The problem of finding a place to put the low-level radioactive waste generated by
nuclear power plants, hospitals and industries has plagued the nation since at least the seventies, and one might argue that it has been
a problem since radioactive material was discovered at the end of
the nineteenth century.' While the Texas Compact represents a
long-awaited solution to the problem of finding a place to put
Maine's low-level radioactive waste, it also presents some problems
of which Mainers should be aware. For example, the ultimate destination of this low-level radioactive waste, Sierra Blanca, is a poor
community made up primarily of Hispanic and Native-American
farmworkers. Many critics of the Texas Compact charge that this
area was chosen for the construction of the disposal facility because
the population had no political power or money with which to offer
any resistance to the decision. This decision, they argue, was an example of "environmental racism." 3
The existence of low-level radioactive waste and the need for its
safe disposal is a serious problem that the nation must come to grips
with in the very near future. With the recent problems threatening
to close Maine Yankee, Maine's only nuclear power plant, the
problems presented by low-level radioactive waste may soon become especially acute here in Maine. Should Maine Yankee suffer
any serious accidents, or be forced to shut down before its license
expires, Maine would immediately be faced with vast amounts of
potentially dangerous waste that would have to be disposed of safely
and responsibly. Since the Texas Compact has not yet been voted
1. See infra Part lII.B.
2. See Michael E. Bums & William H. Briner, Setting the Stage, in Low-LEvL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND FEAR 1, 5-6 (Michael
E. Bums ed., 1988) [hereinafter Low-LEVEL RADIOACrIVE WASTE REGULATION].

3. See infra notes 341-49 and accompanying text.
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into law by Congress, Maine is not assured that a disposal facility
would be available if such a situation arose in the near future. The
recent difficulties at Maine Yankee, coupled with the controversy
surrounding the Texas Compact itself, make low-level radioactive
waste disposal a very relevant and topical issue in Maine.'
This Comment analyzes the Texas Compact from Maine's point of
view, asking whether Maine can accept the Compact as a solution to
its low-level radioactive waste disposal problem. Another purpose
of this Comment is to provide a history of the nation's policy and
Maine's policy with respect to its low-level radioactive waste, so that
readers have an adequate frame of reference by which to judge the
Texas Compact. The Comment begins by discussing low-level radioactive waste itself, what it is, and where it comes from. The Comment then briefly discusses the history of low-level radioactive waste
disposal in the United States, and the federal low-level waste legislation that is in effect today. Next, the Comment traces the events
that led to the adoption of the Texas Compact by Maine and discusses the problems that have kept the Compact from being approved by Congress. The Comment concludes by attempting to
answer the question whether any changes to the Texas Compact are
necessary before it can be approved by Congress or, perhaps more
importantly, before it can be accepted by Mainers.
I.

BACKGROUND

A Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Radioactive waste is a term that applies to a wide variety of material that may differ greatly in chemical and radioactive composition.
Because it is generated in diverse forms, radioactive waste is traditionally defined by its source rather than its physical characteristics 5
Historically, most radioactive waste generated in the United States
has resulted from the production of nuclear weapons, 6 but radioactive waste is also generated by a wide variety of other activities,
many of which are vitally important to our society.
It is important at the outset to distinguish between high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) and low-level radioactive waste (LLRW),
since confusion between the two classifications has often led to misunderstanding in important policy decisions.7 HLRW is generated
primarily during the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel in nuclear
4. See infra notes 16 and 18.
5. See EDwARD L GERsHEY ET AL, Low-LEvEL RADIOACrIVE WS
j
CRADLE To GRAvn 1 (1990).

FRort

6. See id.
7. See DoNALD L. BAi.nrr & JAhms B. STEELE, FoREv 1hopm NuCL.nA
WAsTE iN AMmRcA 214-15 (1985); Jorge Contreras, In the Village Square:Risk Misperception and Decisionmaking in the Regulation of Low-Level Radioactive Was
19 EcoLooy L.Q. 481, 502 (1992); Timothy L. Peckinpaugh, The Politics of Lon-

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:515

power plants,' and is concentrated in low volumes with high radioactivity.9 In 1983, the federal government agreed to dispose of the
HLRW produced by civilian nuclear power plants."0 The Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 required the Department of Energy
(DOE) to select and construct one or more sites for the disposal of
the growing accumulation of stored HLRW, but because of the inevitable problems with siting a waste disposal facility, that goal has not
yet been accomplished." Similar problems have been encountered
inthe effort to site LLRW disposal facilities.
LLRW accounts for eighty-five percent of the volume of radioactive waste generated in the United States, but it represents only one
percent of the total radioactivity of that waste. 2 It is inherently less
dangerous than HLRW, requiring only marginal shielding to be
safely stored or disposed, and it will decay very rapidly relative to
IILRW. 13 LLRW consists of a wide variety of materials such as
sludge and filters from nuclear power plants, contaminated laboratory equipment and unused reagents from hospitals, protective
clothing and equipment, and wastes from the production of such
consumer goods as smoke detectors, luminous watch dials, and illuminated signs. 4
Of the variety of sources of commercial LLRW in the United
States, nuclear power plants are certainly the most prolific generaLevel Radioactive Waste Disposal in Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REoULATION, supra note 2, at 45, 45.
8. See GERSHEY Er AL., supra note 5, at 4.
9. See i. at 3.
10. See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Says It Cannot Meet Goalfor Nuclear-Waste Disposal, N.Y. TMms, Feb. 6, 1997, at A14. See also 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (1994). A great
deal of HLRW is also produced by the Department of Energy and national defense
projects, and much of it is currently stored by the federal government in facilities
such as the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina, the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory in Idaho, and the Hanford Reservation in Washington. See GERSHEY ET
AL.,

supra note 5, at 4.

11. See GERSHEY E AL., supra note 5, at 7. The Department of Energy first
considered locating a disposal site near Lyons, Kansas. But, "[a]fter much politicking," it changed its mind and began to investigate sites near Yucca Mountain in
Nevada. Id.See 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (1994). Currently, there is no federal facility for
the disposal of HLRW, and consequently, generators have been forced to store
HLRW well beyond their reasonable capacity. See Wald, supra note 10. The Yucca
Mountain site is still a possibility, but experts have recently estimated that the site
will not be ready until 2010. See id One proposal has called for a temporary storage
site ("essentially a fenced-off parking lot for massive storage casks") to be established during the interim, but the Clinton administration opposes this course of action, believing that it will just delay the opening of a permanent site. See id.
12. See GERsHEY Er AL., supra note 5, at 12.
13. See Peckinpaugh, supra note 7, at 46.
14. See generally GERSHEY Er AL., supra note 5 at 20-25; Michael J. Welch et al.,
Low-Level Radioactive Waste at University Medical Centers, in Low-LEEL RADIoACrTvE WASTE REGULATION, supra note 2, at 109, 112; Contreras, supra note 7, at
486-87.
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tors. 15 For example, Maine Yankee, a nuclear power plant located
in Wiscasset, Maine, has annually generated over ninety percent of
Maine's waste. 6 One important consideration for the future of
LLRW disposal is that, as of 1990, there were over one hundred
nuclear power plants in the United States, virtually all of which were
built in the sixties and seventies and designed for an active life of
thirty to forty years.' 7 Maine Yankee, for example, is scheduled to
shut down or "decommission" in 2008.18 Decommissioning a nuclear power plant generates vast amounts of LLRW (consisting of
the actual equipment, body, and structure of the plant itself) that
will consume a large amount of disposal space.' 9 Therefore, decom-

15. See Contreras, supra note 7, at 486.
16. See BARLbi-r & STEELE, supra note 7, at 212-13. Maine produced about
12,000 cubic feet of LLRW per year during the eighties, which accounted for less
than two percent of the waste produced in New England and less than one percent
of the waste produced in the nation each year. See P.L. 1985, ch. 493, § 1. More
recently, Maine has produced about 6,000 cubic feet of LLRWV per year. See Deep in
the Heartof Texas: New LLW Compact Options, NucLEAR VAsTE NEws, Apr. 22,
1993, availablein 1993 WL 2753928. Maine Yankee, constructed at a cost of about
$231 million, began operation in December 1972. See Joseph Pereira, In Maine Vote,
Rising Unease May Shut Nuclear Pant WALt. ST. J., Sept. 23,1937, availablein 1937
WI-WSJ 303360. Since then, Maine Yankee has been beset with a multitude of
problems. In 1980, 1982, and 1987 serious challenges were mounted against the
plant culminating each time in statewide referendums, but in all three cases the voters of Maine have allowed Maine Yankee to continue operations. See Marc Sperber,
Maine Voters Defeat Referendum to Close Maine Yankee by 58% - 42%, NucL.EoN.
ics WK., Nov. 5, 1987, at 2, available in 1987 WL 2114528. The plant's safety has
again been called into question after shutdowns in 1995 resulting from a short in the
electrical generator and tests finding half the plant's steam generator tubes were
cracking. See bx Tbrkel, The Power of TV to Mixed Reviews, Maine Yankee Takes
to the Air to Counter Recent Reports of Problems at its NuclearPowerPlant,POrLAND PR.ss HERALD, Sept. 15,1996, at IF, availablein 1996 WL 11240974. In addition, workers and visitors to the plant have been exposed to radiation, allegations of
mishandling nuclear fuel have been made, and studies have found the plant's records
of safety requirements and required reports have not been handled properly. See Id.
As of this writing, Maine Yankee continues to be shut down under a confirmatory
action letter from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission prohibiting it from reopening
until it fulfills certain agreements. See David Steilfox, OpponentsSeek Plant Closure
as Maine /Entergy Negotiate Contrac NUCLEONICS VK., Jan. 30, 1997, at 12, available in 1997 WL 8870238. Thus, a shutdown that was expected to last weeks has
stretched into months after the initial problem with "cable separation issues" was
compounded by the discovery of leaking fuel rods. See id. With the resulting resurgence of opposition to the plant again becoming a major issue, LLRNV disposal
problems in Maine take on a more menacing appearance.
17. See GERSHY ETr AL., supra note 5, at 20.
18. See Stellfox, supra note 16. Although Maine Yankee's license doesn't expire
until 2008, a citizen's group calling itself "Cheaper, Safer Power," reacting to the
problems discussed supra note 16, is seeking to permanently close the plant on January 1, 2000. See id. Of course, if their plan is successful, it will cause LLRWV disposal
planners substantial worry.
19. See Contreras, supra note 7, at 486.
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missioning presents important planning problems.20 The remainder
of the LLRW produced in Maine is generated by biomedical researchers and other institutional facilities, and the Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard industrial facility."1
While LLRW is certainly not as dangerous as HLRW, there is
much debate concerning the exact level of risk from exposure to
LLRW. Exposure to radiation causes two types of damage to

human tissue: "somatic" damage, which usually appears as cancer,
and genetic damage.'

Because these types of injury take years to

appear, or even generations in the case of genetic damage, there is
an inherent difficulty in tracing particular manifestations of radiation damage to specific exposures.' 3 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has adopted the "linear, no-threshold model," which
assumes a proportional relationship between health risk and radiation exposure, leading to the conclusion that there is no safe level of

exposure.' Yet as inhabitants of this planet, all of us are exposed to
radiation every day; normal background radiation in the environment originates from cosmic rays emanating from outer space, terrestrial radiation from radionuclides in the soil, and radionuclides
naturally occurring in the human body.25 The estimated risk of fatal
cancer from this naturally occurring background radiation in the environment is about thirty-six times higher than the risk of fatal cancer from continued exposure to a properly operating LLRW
disposal site.26 Indeed, the risk of fatal exposure from a properly
20. The three methods by which decommissioning waste may be handled include
"prompt dismantlement," "entombment," and the "safestore" method. See MAINE
Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AUTHORITY, TOWARD A BETrER UNDERSTAND.

ING... MAINE's Low-LEVEL RADIOACtiVE WASTE 8 (1991) [hereinafter TOWARD
A BE TER UNDERsTANDINC]. Prompt dismantlement involves removing and transporting the radioactive components of the power plant to disposal facilities shortly
after the power plant has ceased operation; officials plan to use the prompt dismantlement method to dispose of the decommissioning waste that will be generated
when Maine Yankee shuts down in 2008. See id The other two methods by which
decommissioning waste can be disposed are entombment, in which the containment
building of the power plant is simply filled with concrete, sealing it from the environment, and the safestore method, in which the decommissioning waste is sealed from
the environment for a period of up to 60 years, allowing the radioactive material to
decay to less dangerous levels before ultimately being dismantled and shipped to a
disposal facility. See id.
21. See P.L. 1985, ch. 493, § 1. In 1989, the Maine generators of LLRW requiring
a license to dispose of their waste were: Bates College, Bigelow Laboratory, FMC
Marine Colloids, Foundation for Blood Research, Idexx Corp., Jackson Laboratory,
Lincoln Pulp & Paper, Mt. Desert Bio-Laboratory, Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard, University of Maine, Ventrex Lab, Inc. and, of course, Maine Yankee. See
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, at 6.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Contreras, supra note 7, at 491.
See iU. at 491-92.
See id. at 492.
See GERSHEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 146.
See Contreras, supra note 7, at 497.
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operating disposal facility is small when compared with the risks of
death from27activities we take for granted, such as driving a car or
swimming.
Yet, as a society, we have been adamantly opposed to the pro-

posed siting of a LLRW facility near our homes or in our state, even
though such a location would put us at a very small risk.,' The fear
of atomic energy arose generally in the public's mind in the beginning years of the Cold War following World War IEI'

and the fear of

radioactive waste soon followed in the late sixties 30 Many factors
contributed to the public's growing fear of radioactive waste. One
factor was the growing distrust of the federal government to properly handle the waste 3 l Another was the media's extensive coverage and exaggeration of the risks from radioactive waste. 2 And
certainly another was the public's deep-seated fear of anything connected with radiation, especially radioactive wastep The fact remains that we as a society have chosen to incur huge costs to
minimize the relatively small danger of injury from exposure to
LLRW.34 This Comment takes the position that while properly run
LLRW disposal facilities should present few health or safety risks to

its neighbors, those neighbors must be treated with openness and
27. See id at 498.
28. LLRW disposal facilities have shown all the classic characteristics of LULUs
("locally undesirable land uses") and NIMBYs ("not in my backyard"). See id. at
535-36. For a discussion of LLRW disposal facilities as NIMBYs and of NIMBYs in
general, see ORLArDo E. DELOGU, MAINE LAND USE CONTROL LAWr CASEs,
NOTES, Coinvmirrs (2d ed. forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at ch. 10, on file with
author).
29. See Bums & Briner, supra note 2, at 27-28. Bums and Briner attribute some
of the fear of atomic energy during this period to the public's realization of the
horrors of a future war involving nuclear weapons. See i
30. See Contreras, supra note 7, at 499.
31. See i at 500. In addition to federal government mishandling of radioactive
waste and accidents at federal disposal sites, "[p]ublic confidence in the Atomic Energy Commission was shaken after it appeared that the agency had covered up the
dangers of fallout from nuclear weapons testing." Id
32. See U4. at 500-01.
33. See i& at 503. By 1974, surveys indicated that 52% of Americans considered
radioactive waste management "a serious problem." Id. There are many factors
that can account for this fear of radiation. First, the damages that can result from
exposure to radiation, cancer and genetic mutation, are generally dreaded in today's
society. See id.Second, the collective mind of the public usually associates radiation
and radioactive waste with "nuclear war and disasters of immense proportions." I&
Third, radiation is a "public risk" that we, as individuals, feel we have no control
over. Id. at 504. Finally, the risks inherent in exposure to radiation are still relatively unknown and the idea that radiation is invisible and that one may be exposed
and yet not manifest symptoms of any injury for years is particularly frightening. See
id.
34. See id.at 498-99. For example, small relatively harmless leaks of radioactivity
from LLRW disposal sites have stirred up political pressure to impose safety regulations that have driven up the cost of facilities themselves from about $10 million to
about $60 million. See i at 498.
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respect by planners who propose to site a disposal facility in the
"backyard" of the neighborhood. As noted, the major reasons for
the "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) problems with LLRW disposal
facilities are misunderstanding, mistrust, and lack of information.
By sharing information and opening up the process to the public,
planners will have a greater incentive to act responsibly and safely,
and perhaps a greater trust between the public and planners will be
the result.
B. Disposal Before the Federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act of 1980

1. 1962-1979. The Rise and Fall of Commercial Siting
While before 1960 most commercial LLRW was simply dumped
36
into the ocean,35 by 1962 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
was willing to allow private companies to develop commercial facilities for the disposal of LLRW using a technique known as "shallow
land burial" (SLB). 37 The ABC thus announced a policy that envi-

sioned establishing regional commercial sites "as needed" throughout the nation.38 At this time, the volume of LLRW produced in the
nation was rapidly increasing, 39 and several companies quickly submitted their applications, hoping to be granted a share of the captive
35. See Bums & Briner, supra note 2, at 30. Commercial generators of LLRW
were allowed to dispose of their waste in the ocean from 1946 to 1970, but a moratorium on the issuance of new licenses for ocean-dumping was imposed in 1960. See
Amelia Ann Hagen, History of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposalin the Sea, In
RADIOAcrrvE WASTES AND THE OCEAN 47,51 (P. Kilho Park et al. eds., 1983). The
majority of waste was deposited into the sea from 1946 to 1962 at four major sites.
TWo sites were located off the coast of Sandy Hook, New Jersey, and the others were
located in Massachusetts Bay and off the coast of San Francisco, California. See td.
at 49.
36. The AEC was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 585, 60
Stat. 755, 756 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (1994)). The
policy of this Act was that, "subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic
energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare,
increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace." Id § 1(a), at 756. The AEC was abolished in
1975 and replaced by the Energy Research and Development Administration, see 42
U.S.C. § 5811 (1994), and the NRC. See id. § 5841.
37. See GER HEY ET A.., supra note 5, at 47. "Shallow land burial consists of
excavating a trench or vault, emplacing the waste, minimizing void space within the
disposal unit, and covering the waste with earth to control access to the waste."
D.G. Jacobs & R.R. Rose, Shallow Land Burial of Radioactive Wastes, in MANAoEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERA
S AND WASTES: ISSUES AND PROGR ss 54, 54
(Shyamal K. Majumdar & E. Willard Miller eds., 1985) [hereinafter MANAOGEMENT
OF RADIOACrTVE MATERIAIS AND WASTES].

38. See BARLErr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 198.
39. See GERsHEY Er A.., supra note 5, at 47.
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market in LLRW disposal.4 0 The sites themselves were to be owned
by the individual states, operated by the licensed company, and subject to federal or "agreement state" regulations 1
The first commercial site for disposal of LLRW in the United
States opened in 1962 in Beatty, Nevada." The second was opened
in 1963 in Maxey Flats, Kentucky4 3 From 1963 to 1971, four more
commercial sites opened across the country: in West Valley, New

York (1963), Richland, Washington (1965), Sheffield, Illinois (1967),
and Barnwell, South Carolina ( 1 9 7 1 ).M In contrast to the AEC's
1960 policy statement, the sites were not established "as needed" on
a regional basis; actually, very little thought was given during the
licensing process to the suitability of the locations or the regional
needs for facilities.4 5 Site selection and development was completely in the hands of the private businesses who ran them

and

there was little regulation or performance criteria involved in the
licensing process.4 7 Indeed, the first standards concerning the
method of disposal at commercial sites did not exist until promulgation in 1981.48 All six sites used SLB based on the technology that
was used at federal LLRW disposal facilities, technology which the
federal government had claimed was "perfected. ' 4 9 But there was
no independent monitoring of federal facilities, and although the
40. See id. The companies that had acted as brokers in the ocean-dumping process by taking the LLRW from generators, packaging it, and shipping it out to sea
recognized a lucrative enterprise created by the AEC licensing process. See It. Because safe disposal was a necessity for LLRW generators, and because qualified operators willing to accept such waste were scarce, simple economics promised
substantial return for investment in a LLRW disposal facility.
41. See Burns & Briner, supra note 2, at 39. Amendments to the Atomic Energy
Act allowed some states ("agreement states") to implement their own radiation protection programs, provided that the programs were found to be at least as stringent
as the federal legislation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) (1994); Burns & Briner, supra
note 2, at 39. As for the six states in which commercial sites would soon open, five
had "agreement state" status, and their sites were licensed through the state. The
site that would open in Illinois would be licensed directly by the AEC. See MARY R.
ENGLISH, SrTING Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE VAsTE DIsPosAt FAcMUMES 6 (1992).
42. See GEnsHEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 47.

43. See Bums & Briner, supra note 2, at 39.
44. See BAR.Err & STEELE, supra note 7, at 199.
45. Seeid.
46. See id.
47. See GEmSHEY Er At., supra note 5, at 47.
48. See t. See also Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive
Waste, 10 CFR § 61 (1997) (current standards).
49. See BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 199. LLRW that was generated by
the federal government had been disposed of by SLB at federal installations. See Id
at 198. During the Manhattan Project in the thirties and forties federal disposal
facilities for government-generated LLRWV were established at Hanford, Washington; Idaho Falls, Idaho; Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Savannah River, South Carolina. See Burns & Briner, supra note 2, at 29.
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public "could 5only
assume that all were successful," the truth was,
0
they were not.
By 1978, three out of the six commercial sites that had opened
between 1962 and 1971 had closed, and the other three were threatening to close."' The problems at the sites that closed in the seventies were primarily with water management. The West Valley site
experienced years of difficulty with groundwater accumulation in
the trenches, massive erosion, and minor migrations of radioactive
material. The site finally gave in to political pressure by closing in
1975.52 The Maxey Flats site experienced large-scale subsidence of
the trenches as well as problems with accumulation of water and
erosion almost identical to those of West Valley.53 When state officials found local groundwater infected with radioactive leachate,
Kentucky cancelled the site's lease in 1977 and the Maxey Flats site
was forced to close.' The Sheffield site closed in 1978 when the
NRC failed to grant site operators a permit to expand before its
disposal capacity was exhausted. 5 Before closing, the Sheffield site
experienced its own problems with erosion, subsidence, and migration of radioactive leachate5 6 The problems experienced by the
three sites that closed emphatically demonstrated that "water is the
major enemy to be avoided in future site operations."- 7 Since the
sites closed, remedial actions have been necessary to restabilize
trenches and mitigate water accumulation problems. Despite these
measures, drainage continues to be a problem that requires constant
monitoring. 8
2. 1979: The Disposal Crisis

It is important to note that the West Valley, Maxey Flats, and
Sheffield sites closed at a time when commercial LLRW production
50. See BALErr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 199. See generally RONNIE D. LIP.
scHuTz, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: PoLITIcs, TECHNOLOGY, AND RISK 129 (1980)
(describing the haphazard disposal procedures at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho Falls).
51. See Burns & Briner, supra note 2, at 40.

52. See GERSHEY

ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 52. See generally John M. Matuszek,

Safer Than Sleeping with Your Spouse-The West Valley Experience, in Low-LEVEL
RADIOACrIvE WASTE REGULATION, supra note 2, at 261 (analyzing the West Valley
failure).

53. See Ralph DiSibio, Operation of a Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility and
How to Prevent Problems in Future Facilities, in MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACrrvE
MATERIALS AND WASTES, supra note 37, at 137, 139.
54. See GERsHEY Er AL., supra note 5, at 49.
55. See iL at 54.
56. See id. at 54-55.
57. DiSibio, supra note 53, at 139.

58. See

GERSHEY ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 55.
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was soaring. 9 With those three sites closed, the three remaining
"sited" states began to feel the burden of responsibility for the entire nation's LLRW.6° None of the three wanted to become permanent repositories for the United States' LLRW,6 ' and all of the three
would attempt measures to either limit or entirely cut off the waste
they were required to accept from other states.62 This situation resulted in a crisis in the fall of 1979 when two of the sited states had
temporarily closed their facilities, and the third had reduced by half
the volume of waste it was willing to accept.'
Just as Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina became aware
that they were the only LLRW disposal sites left open in the United
States, their options were suddenly limited by an important 1978
Supreme Court decision. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey64 several
New Jersey landfill operators and the out-of-state cities with which
they contracted brought an action against the State of New Jersey
challenging a statute prohibiting the importation of most solid or
liquid waste that was generated or collected outside of New Jersey's
borders.6 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, first established
that the interstate movement of wastes was "commerce" governed
by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.6 The
Court assumed that New Jersey had the right to "reduce the waste
disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining open
lands from pollution,"'67 but then held that the New Jersey statute
violated the Commerce Clause because it employed improper
means to achieve those goals. 68 The State made no showing that
out-of-state waste was any more harmful than in-state waste.69
Therefore, the Court viewed the statute as a protectionist measure
that sought to isolate the state from the nation's waste disposal
problem.70 New Jersey could not solve its waste disposal problem
by discriminating against articles of commerce in violation of the
Constitution.71 Thus, the three sited states faced a dilemma: They
could either place limits on the amount of LLRW (in-state and out59. See BARL=Er & STEELE, supra note 7, at 201. From 1975 to 1978, the volume

of waste disposed at the commercial facilities increased by 60%. See id.
60. See Michael E. Petrella, Wasting Away Again: Facingthe Low-Leel Radioactive Waste Debacle in the United States, 5 FoHAwmi
ENvr.. LJ. 103, 112 (1993).
61. See Deborah M. Mostaghel, The Low-Level RadioactiveWaste PolicyAmendments Act: An Overview, 43 DEPAuL LRnv. 379, 385 (1994).
62. See BAaRLErr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 201-03.

63. See id. at 203.
64. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
65. See id. at 618-19.
66. See id. at 622-23.

67. Id. at 626.
68. See id. at 629.

69. See id.
70. See id.

71. See id. at 626-27.
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of-state) that their facilities would accept or simply close the facili-

ties to all waste.7' Under either option the states would lose capacity to dispose of their own LLRW. Alternatively, they could go on
accepting without limit the LLRW generated by the entire nation.
In the eyes of Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina, none of
these choices were acceptable.
The sited states experienced technical difficulties of their own, but
those difficulties were largely confined to problems with management, packaging, and transportation. 73 Because the sited states
were adamantly opposed to the situation in which they had been
placed, and because each was anxious to make the point that it was
unwilling to accept permanent responsibility for the nation's LLRW
disposal,74 the governors of the sited states often reacted to these
75
technical difficulties by temporarily closing their disposal facilities.
These reactions led to a "crisis" in 1979 when the Richland and
Beatty sites had closed temporarily, and the governor of South Carolina had announced that the Barnwell site, the only site left in the
nation willing to accept LLRW, would reduce the amount of LLRW
it would accept by fifty percent over the next two years.76 During
this period, generators and brokers who made their living hauling
waste to disposal facilities were forced to store LLRW in hospitals,
research labs, power plants, and warehouses, often well beyond the
duration allowed by NRC regulations.77 It was this "crisis" that
would lead to the enactment of federal legislation designed to rem72. The Court theorized that New Jersey could have taken a similar tack. The
Court noted that a state, in order to protect its environment or the health, safety,
and general welfare of its citizens, may regulate the total amount of waste its facilities could accept if it does not discriminate based on where the waste was generated.
See id. at 626-27.
73. The Richland and Beatty sites were not likely to experience problems with
water management because they were located in arid regions of the country. See
GERSHEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 59. Likewise, the Barnwell site managed to avoid
water problems because the porous soil underlying the burial trenches allowed water
to simply drain out. See id. at 56. But one cannot discount the importance of the
fact that Barnwell was the last site to open, and its operators learned a great deal
from the mistakes of other sites. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 7.

74. See, e.g.,

GERsHEY ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 57. For example, after the Three

Mile Island incident in 1979, South Carolina's governor refused to allow the Barnwell site to accept any of the waste generated by the accident. See Id Nevada's
governor also objected to waste from Three Mile Island being shipped to his state,
telling local reporters that if the waste was liquid, "the people responsible for it can
drink it." BARLETr & STm.EL, supra note 7, at 202.
75. For example, the Beatty site closed several times in 1979: first when workers
were discovered to be removing contaminated tools from the site, see GERSHEY ET
AL., supra note 5, at 60; LpscHurrz, supra note 50, at 134, and subsequently when a
truck hauling waste was found leaking and several barrels of LLRW were found
some distance away from the trench in which they were supposed to have been buried. See BARLETr & STEEt, supra note 7, at 201.
76. See BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 202-03.
77. See id. at 203-05.
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edy the situation of the three sited states, all of which had been
threatening angrily to close their facilities permanently unless something was done.
3. 1980: Solution
The actions of the three sited states in 1979 finally focused the
nation's attention on the LLRW disposal shortage in the United
States, and the federal government realized that something had to
be done. The question was one of remedy. The government was
faced with the choice of whether to take over responsibility for disposing of the nation's LLRW itself or to give that responsibility to
the states. A few years earlier, several studies had concluded that
the disposal of LLRW could be better solved on a national basis and
recommended that the federal government assume control of the
siting process. 78 The sited states, however, were adamantly opposed
to the federal government asserting jurisdiction over LLRW disposal.79 The sited states feared that if the federal government took
over, they would lose what little control they had over the disposal
facilities in their states, and they suspected that the federal government would choose simply to maintain the status quo.90 Also, there
was a good deal of mistrust of the federal government's capability of
maintaining safe,
well-run facilities, given its past record of failures
8
and cover-ups. '
The governors of the three sited states formed a coalition to block
any federal effort to take over the LLRW disposal problem, recommending that authority over the problem be given to the states.82
The unsited states agreed with this proposal, since they also feared
that federal intervention could mean that they would not be given a
chance to object to a poorly run disposal facility within their borders.'n In 1980, the National Governor's Association Task Force on
Low Level Waste proposed that authority should be given to the
states to form regional compacts, each containing one or more facili78. See U at 205. In 1976, the House Government Operations Committee recommended that in order to provide a comprehensive, uniform, long-term plan for
the nation, the federal government should reassert federal jurisdiction over commercial sites. In 1977, the NRC recommended greater federal involvement, calling the
situation a "national problem" which the states were not capable of solving. And in
1978, the DOE suggested that it should take over the siting process, combining commercial sites with defense sites. See id

79. See idat207.
80. See id

81. See Contreras, supra note 7, at 500; Mostaghel, supra note 61, at 385 (both
discussing factors contributing to public's mistrust of government oversight of radio-

active waste).
82. See BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 7, at 207.
83. See Mostaghel, supra note 61, at 385-86.
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ties to dispose of LLRW generated within the region.84 The proposal also suggested that the compacts be given the authority to
exclude waste from other regions, recognizing the dissatisfaction of
the current sited states. 5 By this time, several of the officials who
had supported a federal takeover succumbed to the political pressure exerted by the states and now reconsidered their positions, advocating the state approach."
In 1980, Congress took up a bill entitled the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA), which echoed the proposal by the
National Governor's Association Task Force." At this time, Congress was also considering legislation dealing with HLRW, and thus
the two bills were combined, and the House and Senate passed two
very different versions in the summer of 19 80 .ss Given the controversial nature of the LLRW bill, it received very little congressional
scrutiny as it travelled through the legislative process. 89 This lack of
scrutiny was one of several indicators that members of Congress
were unsure of the issues on which they were to vote.' By December it was evident that the House and Senate were not going to

reach a compromise on the combined bill because of differences in
proposed HLRW policy. 9 ' In an effort to salvage the LLRW bill,

legislators carved out the original LLRWPA from the combined
bill,9' and South Carolina's Governor "quietly passed the word that
he would shut down Barnwell if Congress failed to address the is84. See John B. Yasinsky & Charles R. Bolmgren, Radioactive Waste Manage-

ment-A Manageable Task, in

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AND

WASTES, supra note 37, at 73, 92.

85. See Mostaghel, supra note 61, at 386.
86. See BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 209. The DOE and the chairman of
the NRC now felt that states should handle disposal of LLRW. The Carter administration, which had formerly pushed for federal jurisdiction, also recanted and decided that the states should have control. See id.
87. See idat 207-08, 211. The bill was introduced by South Carolina Congressman Butler Derrick. See id.
88. See idat 211, 214.
89. See id.
at 209. The House Science and Technology Subcommittee called only
one hearing in which it discussed the issue of the disposal crisis's impact on the
medical community. The medical community had voiced its opinion supporting the
bill and threatening that, should the crisis continue, crucial biomedical experiments
would have to be curtailed, since there were no willing recipients of the LLRW they
produced. See James W. Conrad, Jr., Note, Glowing Their Own Way: State Embargoes and Exclusive Waste-DisposalSites Underthe Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 654, 655 (1985). While some critics have
suggested that this threat was exaggerated, the fact remains that the medical community was a powerful lobby in favor of the LLRWPA. See BARErr & STEELE,
supra note 7, at 209-11.
90. See BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 214-15 (discussing Senators' misstatements in the debate prior to voting on the LLRWPA).
91. See id.
at 214.
92. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 8.
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sue... ."I Finally, on the eve of December 13, 1980, the LLRWPA

was passed by the legislature, beginning the next phase of the
LLRW saga.94
C. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
The 1980 LLRWPA was short and sweet. Its announced policy
was that "each State is responsible for providing for the availability
of capacity either within or outside the State for the disposal of lowlevel radioactive waste generated within its borders except for waste
generated as a result of defense activities of the Secretary or Federal
research and development activities,"'95 and that "low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and efficiently managed on a regional
basis."96 In order to carry out this policy, the LLRWPA provided

that "the States may enter into such compacts as may be necessary
to provide for the establishment and operation of regional disposal
facilities for low-level radioactive waste."'97 The compacts were to
be negotiated by the states, but would not become official until ratified by Congress. 98 The most important provision of the LLRWPA
provided states with incentive to actually carry out the policy of the
act by forming regional compacts; it gave approved compacts the
right to exclude LLRW that was not generated within the region beginning January 1, 1986.19 Therefore, if a state had not provided a
disposal facility for its own LLRW by joining a compact or constructing its own site, its generators would be left without a place to
dispose of their waste once the compacts' exclusionary power became effective in 1986.100
93. BAR.Err & STEELE, supra note 4, at 214. By this time, additional pressure
was put on Congress because Washington had just announced its intention to close
its site to out-of-state LLRV based on the results of a statewide referendum. See
infra note 135.
94. See BA,..rr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 215. The Congressman who deserved the most credit for the passage of the LLRVPA was the man who introduced
the bill, South Carolina's Butler Derrick. After gaining support for the bill in the
House, he took the extraordinary step of travelling over to the Senate, where he
"stationed himself outside the doors to the Senate floor and lobbied members of the
upper chamber as they went in to vote." Id. at 214.
95. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, § 4(a)(1)(A),
94 Stat. 3347, 3348 (1980) (amended 1985).
96. Id- § 4(a)(1)(B), 94 Stat. at 3348 (amended 1985).
97. Id. § 4(a)(2)(A), 94 Stat. at 3348 (amended 1985).
98. See id. § 4(a)(2)(B), 94 Stat. at 3348 (amended 1985). Congress retained
power to ratify interstate compacts under the Compact Clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cL 3.
99. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L No. 96-573,
§ 4(a)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 3347, 3348 (1980) (amended 1985).
100. See Petrella, supra note 60, at 114.
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1. Compliance with the LLRWPA: Maine and the
Northeast Compact
Maine responded to the enactment of the LLRWPA in 1981 by
passing legislation following the mandate of the federal act by accepting "responsibility for providing for the capacity for the disposal
of low-level waste generated within this State." 10 1 The new legislation gave the Governor authority to negotiate with other states to
remedy the disposal problem, and to recommend regional compacts
with states that had, among other things, "identified areas within
their state that meet preliminary site criteria,"'" but it required legislative approval before the state entered into any proposed compact. 10 3 The Act also established the Low-Level Waste Siting
Commission,'" whose duty it was to "study several aspects of lowlevel waste generation, transportation, and disposal, and to assist the
Governor in regional efforts to manage those wastes."'0 5 Soon
thereafter, Maine searched for other states with which to form a
compact to dispose of its LLRW, as encouraged by the LLRWPA.
Despite early indications of success, the LLRWPA would eventually fail because it lacked effective incentives to induce the states to
enter into the envisioned regional compacts.' 0 6 The three sited
states, anxious to comply with the new law and to rid themselves of
the burden of responsibility for the nation's waste, quickly negotiated compacts with neighboring states.' ° By mid-1982, six compact
agreements had been negotiated, but only six states had gone
08
through the legislative motions of adopting one or more of them.
The process of organizing compact commissions, siting facilities, arranging management for the facilities, complying with licensing requirements, and beginning operations proved to be more difficult
and time-consuming than Congress imagined, 109 but there was also a
significant amount of political stalling by the unsited states." 0 One
101. P.L. 1981, ch. 439, § 9.
102. Id.

103.
104.
105.
106.

See id
See id.
L.D. 1636, Statement of Fact (110th Legis. 1981).
See Mostaghel, supra note 61, at 386.

107. See GERSHEY

ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 117.

108. See Charles H. Montange, FederalNuclear Waste Disposal Policy, 27
RESOURCES

NAT.

J. 309, 370 (1987).

109. See id.

110. See

GERSHEY ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 117. According to the LLRWPA, the

three sited states would be granted the power to exclude waste from outside their
region on the first day of 1986, provided that the compacts to which they belonged
were ratified by Congress. However, even if they complied, they might accept outof-region waste and levy surcharges on the unsited states who had failed to follow
the Act's mandate. Between the fear of paying surcharges on its generated LLRV
some time in the future, and the fear of going through the nasty political process
necessary to site a disposal facility in their own state, unsited states overwhelmingly
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major problem with the process of forming compacts was the different amounts of LLRW generated by the negotiating states; large
waste producers were often excluded from negotiating with smaller
states because even the large waste producers objected to the siting
of a facility within their borders.'
The disparity between small and large waste-producing states was
nowhere better illustrated than in the negotiations for the proposed
Northeast Compact, in which Maine was initially involved during
the early eighties. Upon passage of the LLRWPA, Maine, along
with New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware, looked into the possibility of forming a compact for the
disposal of LLRW generated within the Northeast region of the
country." 2 During the eighteen months of negotiations which resulted in the proposed compact, 1 3 major problems were encountered between the small waste-producing states (the category to
which Maine belonged) and the large waste-producing states." 4
The major difficulty was in choosing a host state for the region's
disposal facility. One proposed solution ignored important criteria
such as who was best suited to be host state by suggesting that the
host state be picked randomly."' The small waste-producing states
insisted on a proposed clause precluding a disposal facility from ever
being located in a state that produced less than three percent of the
region's waste." 6 When the proposed compact was finally drafted
and submitted to the states' governors for approval in February of
1983, it made no mention of which state would host the future dispo-

chose to risk paying the penalty of noncompliance with the LLRWVPA. See Mostaghel, supra note 61, at 386.
111. See BARU~rr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 219. The states that produced the
most LLRW were often unsuited for a disposal facility and usually had high populations. They argued that the disposal site should be in a state where a "safe" facility
could be maintained, regardless of how much waste that state produced. The
smaller waste-producing sites disagreed, arguing that the state that produced the

most waste in the region should host the disposal site. "Thus, the act that Congress
claimed would inaugurate an era of cooperation instead ignited political warfare,

pitting state against state, region against region." Id.
112. See Anne D. Stubbs, The Northeast Low-Level Waste Compact: Regional

Cooperation in Low-Level Waste Managemen, in MANAGEZMET OF RADIOACrvE
MATERIALS An) WASTES, supra note 37, at 42, 43.
113. See id.
114. See BARL~rr & STEm.E, supra note 7, at 231. The small vaste-producing
states were Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Delaware; these

states' combined waste accounted for about five percent of the region's LLR\V. The
large waste-producing states, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey,

Connecticut, and Maryland, accounted for the remaining 95%. See id.
115. See id. at 231-33.
116. See id.
at 233.
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sal site and left the decision to the compact commission 1 17 unless a

member state volunteered for the unpleasant assignment." 8
By 1984, "the fragile unity of the Northeast states began to crumble.""' 9 None of the Northeast states had volunteered as hoped;
New York and Pennsylvania, wary of being chosen as host state because of their large waste production, withdrew from the negotiations. 120 In early 1983, Maine was still considering entering the
Northeast Compact,' 2 ' but later that year, obviously concerned with
avoiding host-state status, it passed legislation setting out a formal
siting process, which required public participation and legislative approval before siting a facility within the state. " By this time, Maine
had indicated it would not be a party to the Northeast Compact,'2 3
and in 1984 was considering banding together with New Hampshire
and Vermont in a smaller New England Compact, making a separate agreement with a large waste-producing state, or remaining independent." 2

In the end, out of the eleven states that began

negotiations, the Northeast Compact was adopted only by Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland."

In 1985, Maine's prospects for entering a disposal compact by the
LLRWPA's 1986 deadline looked bleak, and in response to the situ-

ation Maine passed some important legislation dealing with LLRW.
First, the Advisory Commission on Radioactive Waste was created
to replace the Low-Level Waste Siting Commission.' 2 6 The new
commission was given "an expanded role, including [responsibility
for] high-level as well as low-level waste."' 2 7 In addition, a referen117. The Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission was to
be established by the compact. According to the proposed draft, the commission
was to be made up of one member appointed from each state and two members
from any active host state. See Stubbs, supra note 112, at 48.
118. See id. at 50.
119. BARLET & STEELE, supra note 7, at 245.
120. See id at 245-46.
121. See L.D. 663, Statement of Fact (111th Legis. 1983). Apparently the Maine
Legislature felt sure that Maine would join the Northeast Compact within a year,
only funding its siting commission until the expected adoption of the compact: "The
proposed Northeast Regional Interstate Radioactive Waste Compact is expected to
have a June 3, 1984, initial ratification cutoff date. It is prudent at this time to allocate funds for the [low-level waste siting] commission through fiscal year 1984." Id.
122. See P.L. 1983, ch. 500, § 5.
123. See BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 7, at 233-34.
124. See i&L at 234, 246-47.
125. See id.at 247. Maryland and Delaware soon dropped out of the Northeast
Compact to join the Appalachian Compact. See infra note 169 and accompanying
text. Thus, the Northeast Compact is presently made up of only two states, Connecticut and New Jersey; in addition, these two states solved the dispute over who
was to be host state by agreeing that each would build its own disposal facility and
be responsible for its own waste. See id.
126. See P.L. 1985, ch. 309, § 6.
127. L.D. 642, Statement of Fact (112th Legis. 1985).
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dum held that November resulted in the enactment of legislation
requiring voter approval for either operation of a disposal facility in
Maine or Maine's participation in an interstate compact agreement
that would export Maine LLRW to another state."2 The same legislation remains in effect today, and played an important role in the
debates over the Texas Compact.
By 1985, it became obvious that no state would meet the 1986
deadline by assuming responsibility for the low-level waste generated within its borders. Thirty-seven states had, by that time, tentatively entered into compacts, but none of the compacts had been
ratified,' 29 only three compacts had designated host states for the
disposal site, 3 0 and no new disposal facilities had been constructed
or even sited. 31 Congress moved especially slowly in ratifying proposed compacts, giving the impression that it was waiting for all the
compacts to be negotiated before it approved the first.132 If a state
had not yet assumed responsibility for its waste, its members of Congress were reluctant to ratify another region's compact.133 David
Stevens, an aide to the Governor of Washington, stated the problem
precisely: "'I just don't see any Congressman voting for a compact
that would shut off a burial site for his state .... I just don't see him

voluntarily voting on such a measure. Then he's really created a
political problem for himself.""'
Finally, Congress again realized that something would have to be
done to remedy the situation. Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington, each of whom had continued to accept the nation's waste
since enactment of the LLRWPA, 35 found themselves in the same
128. See Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1492 (West 1989).
129. See Petrella, supra note 60, at 114.
130. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 8. The Northwest Compact had designated

Washington as its host state; Washington planned to allow the region to use the
Richland site for disposal of its LLRW. The Rocky Mountain Compact had chosen
Colorado as its host state, and the Central Midwest Compact had chosen Illinois as
its host state. See Ud
131. See Petrella, supra note 60, at 114.

132. See BARLE-r & STEm.,
133. See id.

supra note 7, at 238.

134. Id.
135. That is not to say that in each case the sited states voluntarily accepted the
nation's waste since the LLRWPA. For example, in 1980, the voters of the state of
Washington enacted an initiative which prohibited "the transportation and storage
within Washington of radioactive waste produced outside the state." Washington

State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629 (1982). In response, the operator of the Richland site along with seven other plaintiffs brought an
action for injunctive relief and for a declaration that the Washington initiative was

unconstitutional. See id. The state creatively argued that by enacting the LLRWPA,
Congress had passed authority to regulate LLRW disposal to the states, and there-

fore, that Washington could exclude out-of-state waste without violating the
Supremacy or Commerce Clauses. See id. The court stated, however, that "[u]ntil
the state participates in a compact which has become law, the Low-Level Waste Act
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position in 1985 that they were in in 1979, and again threatened to
shut down or exclude out-of-state waste as of January 1, 1986.136

The remaining states, however, were relying on the sited states to
continue to accept waste, and if the three states made good on their

threats, the nation would have been faced with a major disposal crisis. Congress responded to this situation by passing compromise
legislation in a haphazard rush to beat both the LLRWPA's 1986
deadline and the date of adjournment for the Ninety-ninth Congress. 37 The sited states agreed to accept a limited amount of
LLRW over the next seven years in exchange for a series of greater
incentives for the unsited states to make progress towards assuming
responsibility for the waste they produced. 138
D. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
The statute that resulted from Congress's rushed efforts to beat

the January 1, 1986 deadline was much more complex than the original LLRWPA. The policies announced by the new Low-Level
Waste Policy Amendments Act (LLRWPAA) were substantially the
same, 139 and, as before, states were allowed to "enter into such compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive
does not grant power to any state to close its borders to interstate traffic in low-level
waste." Id. at 630. Therefore, "[t]he initiative violates the Supremacy Clause because it seeks to regulate legitimate federal activity and to avoid the preemption of
the Atomic Energy Act." Id. In addition, the statute was found to violate the Commerce Clause for the same reasons the New Jersey statute was struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). See id. at 631-32; see also supra text
accompanying notes 64-71. The statute used illegitimate means to serve its purpose
because it discriminated against out-of-state LLRW without a showing that out-ofstate waste posed any different safety or environmental hazards than waste generated within the state; thus, it acted to isolate Washington from the nation's problem.
See Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631.
136. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 8-9. Although Congress had not granted
approval to the compacts to which Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina belonged, and thus, arguably, they did not have the authority to exclude out-of-state
waste, their threats were taken seriously by Congress. See iL
137. See Peckinpaugh, supra note 7, at 56. The compromise bill was finally
passed on December 19, 1985, just hours before Congress adjourned for the holiday
season. See id. Like the LLRWPA, the 1985 legislation was passed by a Senate and
House that had little understanding of the issues the law dealt with or how the law
would operate. See id. at 55-56. The Act was enacted into law by President Reagan
on January 15, 1986. See id. at 49-50.
138. See id. at 54-55.
139. Compare42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A) (1994) ("Each State shall be responsible for providing, either by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal
of ... low-level radioactive waste generated within the State (other than by the
Federal Government)...."), and 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1) (1994) ("It is the policy of
the Federal Government that the responsibilities of the States... for the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and effectively managed on a regional
basis.") with supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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waste."'14 Most important, the new statute extended the period in
which the disposal facilities at Beatty, Nevada, Richland, Washington, and Barnwell, South Carolina were required to accept LLRW
from the remaining unsited states, allowing access to continue until
December 31,1992.141 But unlike the 1980 Act, the LLRWPAA imposed upon the unsited states a series of milestones designed to insure that those states at that time unable to take responsibility for
their wastes would be able to assume responsibility by January 1,
1993.142 It also imposed a series of increasingly severe penalties for
those states in noncompliance. 4 3 The most severe penalty for a
state that failed to take responsibility would have allowed some instate LLRW generators to require that state to take possession and
responsibility for the waste the generator produced.'1
The Act permitted the three sited states to cap the levels of
LLRW they were required to accept for disposal.145 They were also
allowed to impose a surcharge in addition to the normal cost of disposal on out-of-state waste.'1 6 The maximum surcharge allowed to
be imposed on LLRW generators by the LLRWPAA doubled every
two years, authorizing the sited states to charge an amount not to
exceed $10 per cubic foot of LLRW in 1986 and 1987, $20 per cubic
foot in 1988 and 1989, and $40 per cubic foot in 1990, 1991, and
1992.147 TWenty-five percent of the surcharges paid to the sited
states were to be deposited in an escrow account'1 8 to be subsequently paid back to states that fulfilled the statute's milestone requirements, 49 providing the first of the statute's incentives to the
unsited states to comply. The remaining incentives were in the form
of penalties for noncompliance.' 0
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2) (1994).

141. See id. § 2021e(a)-(c).
142. Sec id. § 2021e(e)(1).

143. See id § 2021e(e)(2).
144. See id § 2021e(e)(2)(C).
145. See id § 2021e(b). For example, the facility at Barnwell could limit the

amount of waste accepted for disposal to 8,400,000 cubic feet of LLRW over the
seven-year period. See id. § 2021e(b)(1). The formula used to determine the
amounts each facility had to accept was based on the amounts of vaste they each

accepted in 1983, see ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 10, in order to guarantee that the
sited states would not be forced to accept more LLRW during the seven-year in-

terim period than they did prior to 1986. See Petrella, supra note 60, at 115.
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) (1994).
147. See i § 2021e(d)(1)(A)-(C).
148. See i § 2021e(d)(2)(A).
149. See id. § 2021e(d)(2)(B). The funds received by the state for complying with
the milestones were to be used to "establish low-level radioactive vaste disposal
facilities; ... mitigate the impact of low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities on
the host State;... regulate low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities; or...
ensure the decommissioning, closure, and care during the period of institutional control of low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities." Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(E)(i).

150. See id. § 202le(e)(2).
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The milestones set forth by the LLRWPAA were to be achieved
by each non-sited compact region and each unsited state that was
not a member of a compact region. 5 ' By July 1, 1986, each state
that was not a member of a compact was to either ratify compact
legislation or indicate its intent to develop its own site for the disposal of its LLRW. 52 Failure to achieve this requirement would result
in a doubling of the surcharge imposed on LLRW generators from
the non-complying state by the accepting disposal facility until December 31, 1986, after which the non-complying state could be denied access to the disposal facility.' 53 By January 1, 1988, each nonsited compact region was to identify the compact's host state and to
have taken preliminary steps toward establishing a disposal facility,
such as developing a siting plan. 54 Each independent state was, by
January 1, 1988, to develop a siting plan for its proposed disposal
facility. 55 Failure to comply with this milestone would result in a
doubling of the surcharge imposed by the accepting disposal facility
until June 30, 1988, at which time the surcharge would be quadrupled.' 56 If the non-complying state did not achieve the milestone
requirements by January 1, 1989, that state could be denied access to
the disposal facilities by the sited states.'57 By January 1, 1990, a
complete application for the operation of a LLRW disposal facility
was to have been filed with the NRC or with the agreement state,
or, in the case of an independent state, the Governor must have
declared that the state will be capable of assuming responsibility for
its LLRW on January 1, 1993.158 Failure to meet this milestone
could result in immediate denial of the non-complying state's access
to the disposal facilities. 159 Finally, by January 1, 1992, a completed
151. See idL § 2021e(e)(1). Obviously the three sited states were not required to
comply with the milestones of the LLRWPAA. Also, at the same time Congress
enacted the LLRWPAA it ratified seven interstate compacts. See infra note 166 and
accompanying text. Therefore, those states that had compacted with South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada were exempt from the milestone scheme. Addition-

ally, states that entered a contract with the compact commission of a region with an
operating disposal facility for the disposal of that state's LLRW, while still required
to pay the applicable surcharges on that LLRW, were not required to meet the milestone requirements. See id. § 2021e(e)(1)(F). See also ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 911 (summarizing milestone requirements of the LLRWPAA).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(A) (1994). The declaration of intent could have
been by enactment of legislation or by the Governor's certification. See id.
153. See id § 2021e(e)(2)(A).
154. See id. § 2021e(e)(1)(B)(i).
155. See id § 2021e(e)(1)(B)(ii).
156. See id § 2021e(e)(2)(B)(i).
157. See id. § 2021e(e)(2)(B)(ii).
158. See id § 2021e(e)(1)(C). If the independent state fulfills this milestone by a
declaration that it will be capable of disposing of its LLRW by 1993, the Governor
must also include a description of "the actions that will be taken to ensure that such
capacity exists." Id § 2021e(e)(1)(C)(ii).

159. See id § 2021e(e)(2)(C).
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application for the operation of a disposal facility in each independent state must have been filed with the NRC or with the agreement
state. 60 Failure to meet this deadline would result in triple the
surcharges being imposed on the generators for their LLRW from
the non-complying state. 1 ' If a penalty was imposed on any state
that failed to comply with one of the above milestones, that penalty
would be lifted once the state fulfilled the applicable milestone
requirement.' 6
The most severe penalty imposed on a non-complying state by the
LLRWPAA was the "take title" provision. If a state was unable to
provide for the disposal of the LLRW generated within its borders
by January 1, 1993, the generators of that LLRW could request the
state to take possession of the waste, which would make the state
liable for all damages incurred by the generator after this threshold
date. 163 The state could refuse this request, but would then be required to pay to the generator twenty-five percent of the amount
recovered from the surcharges imposed on that generator from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1992, for disposal of the generator's LLRW.164 If, by January 1, 1996, the state was still unable to
provide for the disposal of the LLRW generated within its borders,
the state was then prohibited from refusing the generators' requests,
and would be required
to "take title" to the LLRW produced by
65
these generators.1
1.

General Compliance With the LLRWPAA

When it enacted the LLRWPAA, Congress also ratified the seven
1
interstate compacts that had been proposed under the LLRWPA. '
160. See id. § 2021e(e)(1)(D).
161. See id. § 2021e(e)(2)(D).
162. See hd. § 2021e(e)(4).
163. See id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(i).
164. See id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(ii).

165. See id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C). Along with being the most severe penalty imposed by the LLRWPAA, the "take title" provision was also the Act's most contro-

versial provision. It was viewed as a necessary addition by the senators sponsoring
the Act, for without it, they feared that the states would not have sufficient incentive
to provide for the disposal of their LLRW. Some, however, doubted whether the

provision would pass constitutional muster. See Petrella, supra note 60, at 118. The
skeptics' prediction proved to be true, for the "take title" provision was ultimately
struck down by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177
(1992). See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.

166. The compacts that were ratified were: the Northwest Interstate Compact on
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management, made up of member states Alaska, Ha-

waii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming; the Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, made up of member states Arkansas,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and

Oklahoma; the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management
Compact, made up of member states Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North

Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia; the Central Midwest Interstate
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Maine was not a member of any of the compacts that were ratified,
having backed out of negotiations for the Northeast Compact, and
167
having been unsuccessful in finding another compact to join.

Within three years, Congress approved two more interstate compacts, 68 bringing the total amount of ratified compacts to nine.
Although there have been no new compacts ratified since 1988, it
should be noted that compact membership is by no means static; in
fact, several states have dropped out of one compact to join another.
For example, Delaware and Maryland, originally members of the
Northeast Compact discussed above, dropped out to join the Appalachian Compact soon after it was ratified. 169 It should also be
noted that, as of this writing, none of170the nine compacts have established an operating disposal facility.

2. Maine's Compliance With the LLRWPAA
Maine responded to the enactment of the LLRWPAA by quickly
passing legislation to meet the fast-approaching July 1, 1986 deadline. In April, 1985, the Maine Legislature passed "An Act to Provide for Development of a State Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Facility if Necessary.' 17 ' The statute allowed the Governor to negotiate with other states to form an interstate compact for the disposal

of LLRW,' T and, since Maine had not yet ratified compact legislation, it satisfied the federal milestone by declaring Maine's intent
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, made up of member states Illinois and
Kentucky; the Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact, made up of member states Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio, and Wisconsin; the Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact,
made up of member states Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming; and the Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management
Compact, made up of member states Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware. See Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-240, §§ 221-27, 99 Stat. 1859, 1860, 1863, 1871, 1880, 1892, 1902, 1909
(1985).
167. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 8.
168. In May, 1988, Congress approved the Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, made up of member states Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
See Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Consent Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-319, § 5, 102 Stat. 471 (1988). In November, 1988, Congress approved the
Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact, made up of member states Arizona and California. See Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 100-712, § 5, 102 Stat. 4773 (1988).
169. See GERSHEY Er AL., supra note 5, at 126-27. Thus, the Northeast Compact,
which was originally conceived of as encompassing eleven states, including Maine, is
presently made up of only two states that do not share a common border.
170. See Suzanne Gamboa, Plans for Radiation Dump Met with Worry, Assurances; Controversy Heats Up as HearingApproaches on Proposed West Texas Facility,
Ausn-rN AmERICAN-STAT'ESMAN, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al.
171. See P.L. 1985, ch. 705.
172. See id.§ 3 (codified as amended at ME. REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 38, § 1474
(West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997)).
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"to develop a site for the location of a low-level radioactive waste
disposal facility within the State."' 73 The title of the bill, however,
made it obvious that Maine would only develop such a site as a last
resort in the event that it was unable to find a suitable arrangement
to ship its LLRW to another state. The three unsuccessful disposal
facilities in New York, Kentucky, and Illinois had experienced
problems with SLB; thus the Maine legislation also outlawed SLB as
a method of disposing of LLRW in the state. 74
To meet the January 1, 1988 milestone, a LLRW disposal facility
siting plan for the state of Maine was completed, reviewed by the
concerned state agencies and the public, and sent to the DOE and
the three sited states in time to meet the deadline.-' The siting plan
consisted of a proposed schedule of the tasks necessary to "screen,
characterize,
select, license, design, and construct a LLRW facility, 176 as well as a discussion of those tasks and the "various external forces... which could adversely affect the schedule."'177 The
proposed schedule suggested that the disposal facility would be operational by "the last quarter of 1995."' t7 While the DOE found
that the Maine plan satisfied its requirement under the federal milestone,17 9 clarifications to the plan were necessary to convince the
sited states that Maine had indeed complied with the LLRWPAA.'80
173.

Id. § 5 (codified as amended at ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1481, 1482

(West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997)). The DOE and the three sited states agreed that
this statute satisfied the federal milestone requirement and Maine vas reimbursed

$6,312.49 for 25% of the surcharges it had paid to the sited states for disposal of its
LLRW. See MAINE AD vIsoRY CONS'N ON RADIOACrvE WASrp, Low-LEvEL RADOAcrrVE WASTE BACKGROUNDER
29 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
BACKGROUNDER].

174. See P.L. 1985, ch.705, § 5 (codified as amended at ME. REv. STAT. Am. tit.

38, §§ 1481, 1482 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997)).

Any... facility developed in the State shall employ the safest available
technology. In order to cope with the humid climate, high water table, cold
winters and other geological characteristics of the State, improved engineered disposal methods in addition to geological barriers shall be used
rather than conventional shallow land burial.
Id.
175. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 173, at 30.
176. Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority Draft Siting Plan, Jan. 1,

1988, 2-1 (on file with Maine Law and Legislative Reference Library) [hereinafter
Siting Plan].

177. Id. at 1-2.
178. Id. at 2-10. Of course, the objective stated in the LLRWPAA is that each
state should be able to "provide for the disposal of all [LLRW] generated within

such state" by January 1, 1993. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1994). Maine admitted
that its siting plan would not meet the deadline, but emphasized "the Governor's
commitment to manage the State's LLRW after January 1, 1993." Siting Plan, supra
note 176, at 4-1.
179. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 173 at 30. The DOE therefore reimbursed
Maine for 25% of the surcharges it had paid to the sited states, an amount totaling

$25,842.78. See id.
180. See id. See also GERSmHEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 129.
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During this period, of course, Maine was still searching for another state that would be willing to make a deal to accept Maine's
LLRW and thereby relieve Maine of the duty to construct its own
disposal facility. In 1989, for example, Maine entered a contract
with the Rocky Mountain Compact that allowed Maine generators
to continue to ship LLRW to the Beatty, Nevada disposal facility'
from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1992.11 The significance of
this arrangement was that Maine's contractual right to ship its
LLRW to Nevada would continue even if Maine was found out of

compliance with a milestone of the LLRWPAA. 18 3 Thus, even if

Maine was cut off under federal law from the Washington and South
Carolina sites, Nevada would still be bound under this contract to
accept Maine's LLRW for disposal. This contract was approved by
Maine's voters in the statutorily mandated referendum on November 7, 1989.11 In addition, earlier in 1989, Maine had for the first
time approached the state of Texas with a draft of a proposed waste
disposal compact between the two states.1 85 Texas, one of the few
remaining independent states, had recently settled on a location for
its LLRW disposal facility, 8 6 and was an attractive potential partner
for other independent states that were, like Maine, still aiming to
join a compact.
To meet the January 1, 1990 milestone under the LLRWPAA,
Maine Governor John McKernan, Jr. declared that Maine would be
capable of assuming responsibility for its LLRW on January 1, 1993,
despite the fact that the 1988 Siting Plan called for the state's disposal facility to be operational no sooner than the end of 1 9 9 5 .a11 His

management plan called for Maine's LLRW generators to store
waste on-site from 1993 (when the three sited states would be allowed to cut off Maine's access under the LLRWPAA) until a disposal facility became available, either within the state or outside of the
181. The disposal facility in Beatty, Nevada, served as the host facility for the
Rocky Mountain Compact. See Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate
Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, § 201, 99 Stat. 1859, 1903 (1986) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1994)).
182. See BAcKGROrNDER, supra note 173, at 33. In return, Maine promised to
pay $168,750 to the Rocky Mountain Compact Commission for each year that it
would have access to the disposal facility. This charge was required to be paid regardless of whether any LLRW was actually shipped to the Beatty site. In addition,
Maine generators would be charged $45 per cubic foot of LLRW for the first 3,750
cubic feet disposed, and $55 per cubic foot for additional waste. See id. at 34.
183. See id at 33. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(F); ENGLISH, supra note 41, at
10.
184. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 173, at 34.
185. See Ud. at 32.
186. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 15. The site that had been chosen at this
point by the state of Texas for its LLRW disposal facility would later be rejected.
See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
187. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 173, at 31.
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state."as Furthermore, the plan noted that the contract between
Maine and the Rocky Mountain Compact guaranteed Maine generators a disposal site until December 31, 1992, and therefore guaranteed that Maine generators would begin 1993 with empty storage
facilities." 8 In addition, the plan stressed that Maine was continuing its efforts to arrange for out-of-state disposal of its LLRW. 90
Finally, if the construction of a disposal facility was not complete by
1996, Governor McKernan promised that a centralized storage facility would be made available to Maine generators who had by that
time exhausted their storage space. 91 Based on the Governor's certification, the DOE found Maine in compliance with the January 1,
1990 LLRWPAA deadline."9
3. New York v. United States
In June of 1992, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
New York v. United States,193 a case in which the state of New York
had challenged the constitutionality of the LLRWPAA. Like
Maine, New York was unaligned with a regional compact, and therefore the outcome of its challenge to the LLRWPAA was very important to Maine. New York had thus far complied with the federal
milestones, but was encountering difficulty in finding a location for
its state disposal facility because of the NIMBY syndrome."m The
state brought its action against the United States in 1990, seeking a
declaratory judgement that the LLRWPAA violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause of Article IV of
the U.S. Constitution. 95 The District Court dismissed the complaint,'96 and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals."9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically to consider New
York's argument that the LLRWPAA violates the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. 98
New York's argument first conceded that Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate the disposal of LLRW,' 9
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id
192. See id. Therefore, Maine was refunded 25% of the surcharges it paid on its
LLRW, an amount totalling $109,479. See id.
193. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
194. See id. at 154. For a discussion of NIMBY, see authorities cited supra note
28.
195. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 154.
196. See New York v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
197. See New York v. United States, 942 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).
198. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 154.
199. See id. at 159-60. See generally, Robert L Glicksman, Interstate Compacts
for Low-Level Radioactive Waste DisposaL A Mechanism for Excluding Our-of-State
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and also that Congress had the power under the Supremacy Clause
to pass legislation that would preempt conflicting state legislation.2"'
The Court agreed with these concessions, 20 1 and also with the basic
premise of New York's argument, which was that "[w]hile Congress
has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in
areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress's instructions."202 The
Court noted, however, that while the federal government could not
require the states to legislate in a certain way, it could encourage the
states to legislate in a certain way by providing the states with incentives.203 For example, Congress would be free to condition the payment of federal funds on the state making certain legislative
choices.20 4 Similarly, where Congress had the authority to regulate
private activity in a certain sphere, it would be free to "offer States
the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards
20 5
or having state law preempted by federal regulation.
Based on the above premise, New York pointed to Congress's
mandate that "[e]ach State shall be responsible for providing, either
by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal of...
low-level radioactive waste generated within the State,"206 arguing
that this constituted a "direct command from Congress, enforceable
independent of the ... incentives provided by the Act. ' ' 2t° Because
"Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program,'"20 New York argued, the LLRWPAA
was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 0 9
Waste, in Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION, supra note 2, at 63, 6667.
200. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160. See generally, Glicksman,
supra note 200, at 65-66.
201. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 159-60.
202. Id. at 162.
203. See id. at 161-66.
204. See id "Such federal 'suggestion' had been approved relatively recently in a
case in which the federal government sought to induce state adoption of a federallydetermined drinking age by withholding a portion of federal highway funds from
those states which failed to accept the congressionally-selected minimum age." Petrella, supra note 60, at 120. This case, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206
(1987), was quoted by Justice O'Connor in the New York v. United States majority
opinion: "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds," New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206 (1987)).
205. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A) (1994).
207. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 169.

208. Id. at 161 (alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
209. See id. at 169.
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The Court, however, declined to construe the LLRWPAA's policy
statement "as a command to the States independent of the remainder of the Act.""21 Instead, the Court adopted the United States'
construction, that the policy statement, when read together with the
remainder of the Act, affords the States three sets of choices21 The
Court then went on to subject each of these three "choices" to a
constitutional test.
The Court divided the incentives by which the LLRWPAA encouraged the states to comply with its schedule of milestones into
three categories. It described as "monetary incentives" the Act's
promised rebate of twenty-five percent of any state's surcharge payments if that state was in compliance with the federal milestones.21 2
The Court held that the monetary incentives operated as permissible
exercises of Congress's Commerce Clause and Spending Clause
21 3
powers, and therefore did not violate the Tenth Amendment.
Nor were the "access incentives," the potential penalties of double,
triple, or quadruple surcharges or denial of access to a disposal facility by a non-complying state, in violation of the Constitution. 14 The
access incentives were permissible because the states were given a
choice between regulating LLRW disposal themselves according to
federal standards215 or being subject to federal regulations that fall
well within Congress's power to authorize states to discriminate
against interstate commerce.2 16

The last incentive under the LLRWPAA reviewed by the
Supreme Court was the "take title provision," under which any state
unable to provide for the disposal of its generators' LLRW by January 1, 1996 could be compelled to take possession of that waste, and
assume liability for any damages caused by its failure to do sO. 2 17
"In this provision," the Court said, "Congress has crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion. '2 1 8 The Court first
pointed out that the effect of the provision was to offer the states a
"choice" between regulating according to federal standards or taking title to its generators' LLRW.219 Of course, the Court had already noted that Congress lacked the power simply to compel a
state to legislate according to federal standards. Neither did it have
210. 1d. at 170.
211. See Ud
212. Id. at 152-53. See generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(d)(2), (e)(1) (1994).

213. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 171-73.
214. See id. at 173-74.
215. Id. at 174 ("by attaining local or regional self-sufficiency").
216.
sites").
217.
218.
219.

Id. ("authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their disposal
See id. at 174-75.
Id. at 175.
Id.
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the power, the Court said, to transfer the ownership of LLRW from
its generator to a state. 22 ° The Court therefore stated:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to
waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone,
would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that
Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between
the two.... A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques is no choice at all."2

Having found the take title provision to be inconsistent with the
United States Constitution, the court determined that it was severable from the rest of the Act,'
the LLRWPAA's bark." 22

and thus removed "the bite behind

III. THE TEXAs
A.

COMPACr

Negotiations and Siting of Facility

As of the January 1, 1988 LLRWPAA deadline, there were seven
states that had not entered into a regional compact for the disposal
of LLRW: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont.'

4

Many of these states were

still interested in joining a compact, however, because it was feared
that an independent state would not have the power under the
LLRWPAA to exclude out-of-state waste. 225 Of these seven re-

maining independent states, Texas was the most attractive potential
partner for a regional compact. Texas had an early start in the siting
process, 226 and as noted above, Texas had by this time chosen a prospective site for its disposal facility. Although experiencing
problems with the NIMBY syndrome, 227 states probably discounted
220. See id
221. Id.at 176.
222. See id at 187.
223. Mostaghel, supra note 61, at 422. It should be noted that the Court, almost
in passing, stated that there was some question as to whether any claim under the
Article IV Guarantee Clause would be justiciable. But it quickly concluded that the
monetary and access incentives which had passed constitutional scrutiny under the
Tenth Amendment also did not violate the Guarantee Clause (assuming that the
question was justiciable) because "neither ...can reasonably be said to deny any
State a republican form of government." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at
185.
224. See GERSHEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 128-29. Washington D.C. had also not
entered a compact; nor had any of the U.S. Territories, which, for purposes of the
LLRWPAA were considered to have the same status as states. See id.
225. See generally, Glicksman, supra note 199, at 67-68. Cf.Conrad, supra note
89 (discussing whether a single state would have the power to exclude out-of-state
waste under the LLRWPAA).
226. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 8.
227. See Rick Zuercher, Maine, Vermont Encourage Texas to Form Low Level
Waste Compact, NUC.EONICS WEEK, May 2, 1991, availablein 1991 WL 2443497. A
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the importance of these problems because NIMBY was to be expected everywhere s As previously noted, Maine approached
Texas in 1989 with a draft of a proposed waste disposal compact
between the two states. Around this time Texas was also being
wooed by Vermont, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico.3 9 By the early
nineties, Maine, Vermont, and Texas had discussed the possibilities
of entering into a regional compact agreement in which Texas would
accept Maine and Vermont's LLRW in return for twenty million
dollars from each state.P0 Texas was certainly considering this offer, 3 but since it had "repeatedly insisted it would provide long
term [disposal] only for LLW generated within its ovm borders, " '
it was hesitant to accept.33
The history of Texas's policy with respect to LLRW disposal is
relatively unique. Soon after the passage of the LLRWPA in 1980,
Texas officials took the responsible position that "their state, the nation's fifteenth-largest waste producer, had a sufficient volume of it
to justify its own burial ground."
Therefore, "[a]s other states began negotiations [in the hopes of forming regional compacts], the
[Texas] legislature created the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste
'' 5
Disposal Authority to build and operate a dump for Texas waste." 3
In early 1983, the Authority undertook a siting study that used hydrological, geological, meteorological and other environmental-imrepresentative of the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority (the

agency charged with finding a suitable site for a disposal facility in Texas) remarked
in 1985, "'[t]he overriding statement of the people is dear. "We need a site, but not

here." NIMBY ("not in my backyard") has followed us wherever we have gone.'"
E. William Colglazier & Mary R. English, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Can New

DisposalSites Be Found? in Low-LEvEL

RADIOACTVE WAsTE REGULATION,

supra

note 2, at 215,222 (quoting T.W. Blackburn IMI, Low-Level RadioactiveWaste Activities in Texas, paper presented at the Radioactive Exchange Decisionmaker's Forum,

Charleston, S.C., June, 1985).
228. See Contreras, supra note 7, at 535-36 (describing NIMBY syndrome generally); Michael E. Burns, Living the Pas Facingthe Future In Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIvE WAS=E REGULAMToN, supra note 2, at 279, 293-94 (discussing NIMBY

generally). The NIMBY protests ultimately caused Texas to reject the site it was
considering for its disposal. See discussion infra notes 242-47 and accompanying
text.
229. See GERSHEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 128.
230. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 15.

231. Txas Governor Ann Richards was approached by Maine Governor John
McKernan, Jr. at a 1991 National Governors' Association conference, sparking
Richards's interest in an agreement between Maine and Texas. From Texas's perspective, Maine was an ideal state to compact with because it was a small vaste-

producing state (at that time generating about 7,000 cubic feet annually compared
with Texas's 30,000-35,000 cubic feet annually) with only one nuclear power plant,
scheduled to be decommissioned in 2008. See Zuercher, supra note 227.
232. Id.

233. See id.
234. BAR.Err & STEELE, supra note 7, at 228.
235. Id. See TE. HEmALT & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 402.002 (West 1992).
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pact criteria to decrease the number of potential sites for a disposal
facility.236 By the end of 1984, the Authority had narrowed its
search for site locations to three counties, but citizen opposition to
an in-state disposal facility was already growing.23 7 In January of
1985, the Texas Authority was prepared to name McMullen County
as the ideal location for a disposal facility; the Authority's projections indicated that a dump could be operational by the middle of
1988.38 By February, however, public opposition to the McMullen
County site had become so great that the Texas Legislature, against
the recommendation of the Authority, ordered that the search for a
suitable site begin anew, this time restricting potential locations to
state-owned land. 3 9

So the Authority started again from scratch, and this time it settled on Hudspeth County, an arid and sparsely populated region, as
the site for the Texas disposal facility.24 Hudspeth County is the
third largest county in Texas, with a population of fewer than 2,000
people- 41 By the end of the eighties, the Authority planned to construct the facility near Fort Hancock in Hudspeth County,24 2 about
thirty miles from El Paso." 3 By early 1991, Maine and Vermont,
anxious to form an interstate compact with Texas, were offering to
help finance the construction of a Fort Hancock disposal facility,'
but again, citizen opposition to the proposed waste dump was growing in nearby El Paso County. 45 Adding to the Authority's
problems, Texas Governor Ann Richards, who favored the formation of a compact between Texas, Maine and Vermont, opposed the
Fort Hancock location for a future disposal facility. 6 Finally, after
spending approximately three million dollars in legal fees, in 1991
the county of El Paso was successful in convincing the
Texas Legisla47
ture to order the Commission to find another site. 2
236. See Colglazier & English, supra note 227, at 220-21.
237. See BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 7, at 228-29.
238. See Colglazier & English, supra note 227, at 221.

239. See id
240. See ENGLISH, supra note 41, at 15.
241. See Richard R. Zuercher, Texas LLW Agency Negotiatesfor 16,000 Acres for
DisposalSite Nuc1.oNics WK., Jan. 23, 1992, at 15, availablein 1992 WL 2460493.

242. See

GERi-SY,

supra note 5, at 131.

243. See Richard R. Zuercher, Texas Postpones Talks with Maine, Vermont over
Forming LLW Compact NucIoNics WK., Dec. 17, 1992, at 10, available in 1992
WL 2459329.
244. See Zuercher, supra note 227.
245. See GERSHEY, supra note 5, at 131.
246. See Zuercher, supra note 227.
247. See Rick Zuercher, Texas LLW Group Back at Square One After State Bans
Fort Hancock Site, Nuc.EONxcs Wi, July 11, 1991, at 10, available in 1991 WL
2443247. For the only published opinion of a case in which El Paso sought to challenge the siting process, see Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority
v. County of El Paso, 740 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. App. 1987), in which the court vacated a
temporary injunction that barred the state from proceeding with the site selection
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In barring the Authority from siting the disposal facility near Fort
Hancock, however, the Texas Legislature passed several pieces of
legislation that made the Authority's job easier. For example, the
Legislature defined an area comprising about 375 square miles in
Hudspeth County in which the disposal facility could be located, this
time with the support of the Governor, the Legislature, and El Paso
County.5 It also rescinded the 1988 statute that confined the Authority's search for potential site locations to public land, and gave
the Authority limited power to exercise eminent domain over privately held land.24 9 Soon the Authority was negotiating to buy a

16,000 acre tract known as "Faskin Ranch" within the statutorilydefined 375 square mile area

5

Finally, the Texas Legislature tried

to protect the Authority from future lawsuits that might delay or
block construction of a LLRW facility at Faskin Ranch by passing a
bill that required any action against the Authority pertaining to the
site selection and licensing of a disposal facility to be brought in the
courts of Travis County."' Most important from Maine's perspec-

tive, "[t]he legislature also cleared the way for Texas to enter into a
compact with other states. The legislature rescinded a provision in
the Texas LLW law that prohibit[ed he state from accepting contaminated waste from other states."Lt It now began to look fairly
process until a trial court heard the merits of another action filed by El Paso County.
See id. at 10. Although the Texas Authority won this battle and was allowed to
continue with plans to utilize the Fort Hancock site, the County of El Paso ultimately won the war.
248. See Zuercher, supra note 247; Tx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 402.0921 (West 1992). Many critics deem suspect the Texas Legislature's motives
in defining the area in which the facility was to be located. One must wonder
whether it is fair to define these boundaries based on what appears to have been
purely political considerations. This topic will be developed more fully below. See
infra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
249. See Zuercher, supra note 247; Tax. HEATm
& SAFErv CODE ANN.
§ 402.0922 (West 1992).
250. See Zuercher, supra note 241. "The extreme northwest tip of the Faskin
Ranch is only seven miles southeast of Sierra Blanca, the Hudspeth County seat,"
but the opposition to a nearby disposal facility was not "expected to be as intense as
was El Paso County's opposition to the authority's proposed Fort Hancock site ... "
Id. Of course, opponents to the siting of the disposal facility at the Faskin Ranch
argued that the site was picked because of "the powerlessness of Hudspeth County
citizens - 'brown people who don't have much money (and) who have no political
clout."' Rift Rattles Radioactive Waste Pact: Texans Argue Over Plan to Take
Maine's Refuse, BANGOR DAm.y NEws, Ma: 12, 1995, availablein 1995 WIL 8760065.
Whether Texas and Maine are guilty of "environmental racism" is an issue that will
be taken up later. See infra notes 341-49 and accompanying text.
251. See Zuercher, supra note 247; TExAs HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 402.029(a) (West 1992). Travis County is the county in which Austin is located,
and it is quite a distance from Hudspeth County. Whether the enactment of this
statute was another act of "environmental racism" is an issue that will be taken up
later. See infra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
252. Zuercher, supra note 247.
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certain that a compact would be formed between Maine, Vermont,
and Texas.

After the Texas Authority settled on Faskin Ranch as the site for
Texas's future LLRW disposal facility in the early nineties, Maine
and Vermont renewed their previous offer to the Authority: In return for adopting compact legislation that would allow the two New
England states to ship their waste to the Hudspeth facility, Maine

and Vermont would help to finance the construction of the facility
itself.53 Maine and Vermont then proposed to pay Texas $50 million toward construction of the facility, and $2.5 million directly to
2
Hudspeth County.5'

A Texas statute capped the amount of out-of-

state waste that the state was allowed to accept for disposal each
year at twenty percent of the average amount of waste produced
annually by Texas."5 That provision presented no problem for a
Texas-Maine-Vermont compact because Maine and Vermont's combined output of LLRW fell well under the cap. 256 The Maine Legislature adopted the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal
Compact in June, 1993, as an emergency measure in order to give
the Secretary of State time to prepare the ballots for the statutorilymandated

November

referendum.

57

The Texas Legislature

253. See Zuercher, supra note 243.
254. See Mike Ward, Connecticut Offers Texas $100 Million to Take its Nuclear
Waste, AUSTIN AMMRUCAN-STATESMAN, Mar. 30, 1993, available in 1993 WL
6779759.
255. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 402.219(c)(1) (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996-1997).
256. See Radwaste: Connecticut Offers Texas $100 Million to Accept Low-Level
Radwast HAzARDoUs WASTE Bus., Apr. 7, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2444903.
As Texas legislators were considering adopting the proposed Texas Compact in 1993,
the state of Connecticut surprised everyone by offering Texas $100 million to be
included in the agreement. The offer was rejected, however, because Connecticut's
output of LLRW by itself surpassed the statutorily-mandated cap. See l By one
estimate, Connecticut produced approximately 24,000 cubic feet of LLRW each
year, compared with Texas's 60,000 cubic feet. By comparison, Maine and Vermont
together produced about 12,000 cubic feet per year. See Deep in the Heart of Texas,
supra note 16.
257. See P.L. 1993, ch. 400. As the Compact was being debated before the legislature, one senator discussed the reasons why the Compact should be adopted
quickly:
Governor Richards in Texas, the last word I had, had not yet signed the bill
and we feel that passing this [bill adopting the compact] now at this time
would be an indication to her that we are serious about wanting to do this
....
The rush is that it [will] send the signal to Texas that the Maine
Legislature has taken as much of an action as it possibly can at the present
time because we want this to happen.
Legis. Rec. S-1078 (1993)(statement of Sen. Pearson). Other Maine legislators discussed the positive and negative aspects of the Texas Compact. For example, one
senator remarked,
I think it is extremely important, that as we go into any agreement that
would transport radioactive waste out of the State of Maine into another
State, that we do so with a full understanding of what our responsibilities
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adopted the Texas Compact later that summer.258 It was now up to
the voters of Maine to decide whether Maine should ship its LLRW
to Texas. 5 9 In Texas, there is no parallel to the statute in Maine
which requires voter approval of the construction or operation of a
disposal
facility within the state, so its legislature's judgement was
60
2

final.
The Maine referendum on the Texas Compact was to be held
Tuesday, November 2, 199361 In the months before the vote, the
debate intensified over whether it was ethical or sensible for Maine
to ship its LLRW to Texas. Those opposed to the Texas Compact
claimed that "it was unfair for Mainers to send their waste to another state where residents don't have the benefit of voting on the
measure."2 62 They claimed that the choice to site the disposal facil-

ity in Hudspeth County, where seventy percent of the residents are

Hispanic, was "environmental racism," a political decision to take
are as a society and what we are imposing on that other State. I think it is

extremely important that as we make these decisions that we do not have
the attitude of out of sight, out of mind.... [T]he people who scream about
the nimby attitude oftentime close their eyes when it comes time to pass it
onto somebody elses [sic] back yard ....
Id. at S-1079 (statement of Sen. Tfitcomb). In the House, one representative spoke
at length about potential problems with the Hudspeth site and the Compact itself.
He argued that "the site chosen in Texas is an area of... much poverty," and that

"the people most affected [by the siting of the facility] have not been brought into
the process as they have been in Maine." Id. at H-1222 (statement of Rep. Holt).
He alleged that "Sierra Blanca was selected as the state's nuclear waste dumping
ground 'for political reasons', not scientific ones," and that "it is wrong to send vste
out of state[,] particularly to Texas where there is no real citizen involvement and no
citizen vote." Id. Another representative responded, "The amount of public input
people in Texas have is a matter for them to decide and not a matter for us to get
concerned about[.] Texas can take care of [itself]." ld. at 1--1223 (statement of Rep.
Mitchell). He added that LLRW disposal facilities are
much better sited in areas that are dry and arid because water is the pathway that will carry the radioactive waste from the facility out into the environment. ... [Tihe chances of [the Texas] site ever leaking are much ...
less than they would be if you located a site in Maine. It just seems to me
to be a much safer way to go, a much more environmentally sound way to
go.
Id.
258. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 403.001-403.006 (West Supp.
1996-1997).
259. See ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1492 (West 1989).
260. Vermont adopted the Texas Compact in 1993. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7060 (1997). Vermont also does not have a requirement that its voters must approve the state's membership in an interstate compact for the disposal of LLRW.
261. See STATE OF MAINE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON RADIOAcTIVE WASTE,
VOTE YES ON QUESMON No. 6 (Sept. 1993) (informational brochure on Texas LowLevel Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact referendum) (on file with the Maine
State Library).

262. David Sharp, Texas Nuclear Waste Plan 'Environmental Racism, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 1993, available in 1993 WL 6333056.
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the "path of least resistance," 63 and they pleaded with Maine to
"do the right thing" by rejecting the compact. On the other side of
the debate, those who supported the Texas Compact pointed out
that the decision to construct a LLRW disposal facility in Hudspeth
County was a decision of the Texas Legislature and was out of
Maine's hands. According to Maine Public Advocate Stephen
Ward: "With or without Maine, Texas is going ahead with the site.
A vote against the compact by Mainers will not kill the project." 2"
Recalling the water problems encountered by the New York, Kentucky, and Illinois sites in the seventies, the supporters claimed that
the dry climate of Hudspeth County was much more environmentally safe for a LLRW facility than Maine. In the end, on November
2, voters approved the Texas Compact by a resounding margin.26
Once Vermont's Legislature acted to adopt the Compact, it would
be up to the United States Congress to give its approval to the
Texas-Maine-Vermont agreement.
B. The Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact
The Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact as
adopted by Maine defines its party states as Texas, Maine, and Vermont." 6 In Article I of the Compact, it provides that "[ilt is the
policy of the party states to cooperate in the protection of the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens and the environment and
to provide for and encourage the economical management and disposal of low-level radioactive waste., 267 The purpose of the Compact is
to provide the framework for such a cooperative effort; to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and the
environment of the party states; to limit the number of facilities needed to effectively, efficiently, and economically manage low-level radioactive waste and to encourage the
reduction of the generation thereof; and to distribute the costs,
benefits, and obligations among the party states.... 2 8
Other important terms defined by the Compact include "host state"
(Texas), and "low-level radioactive waste" (with the same definition
as given by the LLRWPAA or by Texas statute, "so long as the
263. See id
264. Ned Porter, Texans Speak Out on Receiving Maine N-Waste, BANGOR DAILY
Nsws, Oct. 5, 1993, available in 1993 WL 6331115.
265. See Ned Porter, Maine Emphatic in Vote to Export Nuclear Waste, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1993, available in 1993 WL 6443880.
266. See Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact [hereinafter
Texas Compact], § 2.01(13) (The text of the Texas Compact is found at P.L. 1993, ch.

400, § 4).
267. Id. § 1.01.
268. Id
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waste is not incompatible with management and disposal at the
compact facility").2 9
Article I of the Compact establishes the Texas Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Commission, consisting of
one voting member from each party state, except Texas, which as
host state, is entitled to six voting membersP ° The duties of the
Commission include the preparation of contingency plans for the
disposal and management of LLRW in the event that the compact
facility is forced to close, but those plans cannot require any nonhost party state to store its generators' LLRW. 7 The Commission
is also required to estimate the total volume of LLRW to be deposited in the host facility by the host state between 1995-2045, and
based on this estimate, the total amount of waste imported from
non-host states will be capped at twenty percent of the total volume
to be disposed.2 " The Commission may sue and be sued,t but
Commission members are not personally liable for their official acts,
and the "liabilities of the commission shall not be deemed liabilities
of the party states."'2 74 In addition, with a majority vote, the Commission may enter into an agreement with another state or entity for
the importation of LLRW for disposal in the host-state facility, or
may allow the host state or any generators to export LLRW to a
disposal facility outside the party states. 275
Article IV defines the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of
the party states. Perhaps most importantly, the Compact provides
that "[t]he host state shall develop and have full administrative control over the development, management and operation of a facility
for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the
269. See id. §§ 2.01(8), (10).
270. See id. § 3.01. The Compact is designed to guarantee that the host state shall
always have enough votes to constitute a majority of the Compact Commission. See
id. § 7.03. In the event that an additional state or states join the compact, the host

state is allowed to "modify the composition of the commission so that the host state
shall have a voting majority," without the consent of the other party states. See id
In most cases, an official act of the Compact Commission requires majority approval. See id § 3.02.
271. See id § 3.04(7). In addition, if the host state proposes to store or manage
out-of-state waste as opposed to providing permanent disposal, the plan must be
approved by at least four host state members of the Commission. See id
272. See id § 3.04(11); see also Trx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 402.219(c)(1) (West 1992); infra notes 305-06 and accompanying text. The Com-

mission was also in charge of coordinating the volumes, timing, and frequency of
shipments to meet the cap requirement. See Texas Compact, supra note 266,
§ 3.04(11). The host state was given the authority to modify the provisions of this
section according to its state law, as long as by doing so it did not uimpair the rights

of the initial non-host party states [Maine and Vermont]." See [d § 7.09.
273. See Texas Compact, supra note 266, § 3.05(5).
274. Id. § 3.03.

275. See id §§ 3.05(6)-(7).
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party states. '276 In other words, Maine and Vermont are given no
control over where the facility is located or how it is operated. It is
the host state's duty to make sure that a disposal facility exists
throughout the institutional control period,277 and to "[e]nsure...
the protection and preservation of the environment and the public
health and safety in the siting, design, development, licensing, regulation, operation, closure, decommissioning, and long-term care of
the disposal facilities within the host state."278 In addition, the host
state is required to establish reasonable fees to be charged for the
disposal of LLRW.2 79 LLRW generated within the party states is
required to be disposed in the host facility, and the party
280 states are
contractually forbidden from joining another compact.
It is the duty of each party state to "[d]evelop and enforce procedures requiring low-level radioactive waste shipments originating
within its borders and destined for the facility to conform to packag'
ing, processing, and waste form specifications of the host state. 281
Each party state must create and maintain a registry of its LLRW
generators and the amount and class of LLRW it produces, as well
as provide the Compact Commission and the host state with an accounting of LLRW shipped and proposed to be shipped, proposed
transportation routes and methods, and proposed schedules of shipments3 s Procedures for minimizing the amount of LLRW to be
deposited in the host state facility are to be developed and enforced
by each party state, and these procedures may include storage, treatment or management of waste by its generators. 28 3 Each party state
is also bound to "[sleek to join in any legal action by or against the
host state to prevent nonparty states or generators from disposing of
low-level radioactive waste at the facility. '' 284 Finally, every party
state is required to act in good faith with respect to the requirements
of the Compact, and each may depend on the other party states to
do the same. 2
Article V of the Compact discusses the monetary contributions
required as consideration for Compact membership. It mandates
that "[e]ach party state, except the host state, shall contribute a total
276. ld. § 4.01.

277. See id. § 4.04(1).
278. l § 4.04(2).
279. See id. § 4.04(4). Whether a fee is "reasonable" is determined according to
disposal fee criteria established by statute. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 402.272, 402.273 (West 1992). The host state was required to charge the same
fees for LLRW generated in the host state and in the other party states. See Texas
Compact, supra note 266, § 4.04(4).
280. See Texas Compact, supra note 266, §§ 4.02, 4.03.

281. Id. § 4.05(1).
282. See id. §§ 4.05(2), (8).
283. See id. § 4.05(3).
284. Id. § 4.05(9).

285. See id § 4.06.
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of $25 million to the host state." 286 The method and the schedule of
payment is also set forth in Article V.2 Another section of the
Compact provides that each non-host party state must "[p]ay for
community assistance projects designated by the host county in an
amount for each non-host party state equal to 10 percent of the payment provided for in Article V for each such state."'
Article VI is designed to give the operator of the disposal facility
a monopoly on LLRW disposal among the party states. Under this
Article, no person is allowed to dispose of LLRW generated in the
party states anywhere except the host facility, nor may any person
dispose of or manage LLRW within the party states unless it is also
generated within the party states.2 89 The Commission was given authority to determine the appropriate punishment for a violation of
these provisions, which could result in "prohibiting the violator from
disposing of low-level radioactive waste in the compact facility, or in
the imposition of penalty surcharges on shipments to the facility."
Under Article VII, the Texas Compact is to take effect "following
its enactment under the laws of the host state and any other party
state and thereafter upon the consent of the United States Congress
and shall remain in effect until otherwise provided by federal
law."2 9 ' The Texas Compact is subject to review and withdrawal of
consent by Congress every five years after initial ratification." Article VII also contains provisions concerning the procedure and consequences of a party state withdrawing from the Compact,
and
requires seven out of eight votes of the Commission to revoke a
state's membership in the Compact for failure to meet the Compact's terms.294 Also, any other state may be made eligible to join
the Texas Compact by a majority vote of the Commission, provided
it meets the terms of the Compact, and provided the host state legislature approves of its entry.295 "The host state may establish all
286. Id. § 5.01.

287. See id. §§ 5.01, 5.02.
288. Id § 4.05(5).
289. See id §§ 6.01, 6.02. Note that sections 3.05(6) and 3.05(7) allow the Commission to enter into an agreement that would otherwise violate this provision.
290. Id. § 6.03.
291. Id. § 7.07. See also U.S. Comrn. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall, without the

Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State
...

."); 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c)(2) (1994).
292. See Texas Compact, supra note 266, § 7.08. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d)

(1994).
293. See Texas Compact, supra note 266, §§ 7.03, 7.04, 7.05.
294. See id. § 7.06. In order to revoke a state's membership, proper notice and
hearing must be given. Section 7.06 provides the basic procedure for a revocation
hearing. See id.
295. See I. § 7.01.
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terms and conditions for the entry of any state, other than [the original party states], as a member of this compact ....
,296
Article VIII provides "[t]he provisions of this compact shall be
broadly construed to carry out the purposes of the compact, but the
sovereign powers of a party shall not be infringed upon unnecessarily. ' ,297 It also defines the liabilities of all interested parties:
No party state acquires any liability, by joining this compact,
resulting from the siting, operation, maintenance, long-term
care or any other activity relating to the compact facility. No
non-host party state shall be liable for any harm or damage
from the siting, operation, maintenance, or long-term care relating to the compact facility .... Generators, transporters,

owners and operators of facility [sic] shall be liable for their
acts, omissions,298conduct or relationships in accordance with
applicable law.
Finally, Article VIII contains provisions designed to escape judicial
invalidation of the Texas Compact under the Supremacy Clause, and
to escape invalidation of the entire Compact should one provision
be struck down.2 99

Thus, under the terms of the Compact, Maine will be allowed to
ship a certain amount of LLRW (which, together with the waste
shipped by Vermont, may not exceed twenty percent of the waste
produced by Texas) for disposal at the Hudspeth facility for the
thirty-year life of the facility. °0 In return, Maine will be charged
$27.5 million in return for compact membership, and generators will
be charged "tipping fees" based on the volume of waste they dispose.3 ° This money will come from Maine's LLRW generators
rather than its taxpayers, 0 2 with Maine Yankee responsible for the
majority of the cost. Under the Compact, Maine generators are encouraged to minimize the volume of LLRW for disposal at the facility through storage or treatment, but are not allowed to dispose of
their LLRW anywhere but the host facility. Maine will be immune
from any liability resulting from the siting, operation, or maintenance of the disposal facility, but its generators and shippers will be
liable for their acts in accordance with the applicable law. Maine
will be expected to join any legal action by or against Texas, how296. Id.

297. Id. § 8.01.
298. 1d § 8.03.
299. See id §§ 8.05-39.07 (section 39.07 is an apparent typographical error and
this should be section 8.07).
300. According to Maine State Representative Holt, Maine is guaranteed about
300,000 cubic feet of disposal space at the Texas Facility. This represents less than
one half of the space needed by Maine Yankee when it is decommissioned in 2008.
See Legis. Rec. H-1222 (1993) (statement of Rep. Holt).
301. Again, according to Representative Holt, the tipping fees will be about $450

per cubic foot. See id.
302. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 38, § 1545 (West Supp. 1996-1997).
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ever, to enforce the Compact's exclusionary power by preventing
non-compact states or their generators from using the disposal facility. In order to comply with the terms of the Compact, Maine must
ensure that shipments of LLRW to the facility conform with the host
state's requirements, and must provide the Compact Commission
with (1) an accounting of volumes shipped and planned to be
shipped, (2) proposed transportation routes and methods, and (3) a
schedule of future shipments.
C. Evaluation of the Texas Compact
While Maine was negotiating with Texas in the hope that a compact would be agreed upon, it was simultaneously going through the
painful process of searching for a suitable site for a disposal facility
within the state. Like Texas, Maine was experiencing difficulties
with the NIMBY syndrome, but in Maine the siting process was
more susceptible to those difficulties. The most significant hurdle
that had to be overcome by the Maine Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Authority (responsible for Maine's siting process) was a statutorily-mandated election to be held within sixty days of the final
selection of a disposal facility site.303 The election was to be held in
the municipality in which the proposed facility was to be located. 3°
The applicable statute stated: "Unless 60% of the voters casting
ballots in the election approve of the authority's site location decision, the authority shall not locate the facility within the municipality ....1305
In addition, the proposed facility needed to be approved
by the state legislature, 30 6 as well as by the voters in a state-wide
election.3 7 As one would expect, it was difficult to convince sixty
percent of a municipality's voters that they would be benefited by a
LLRW disposal facility operating within their town. Therefore, the
Maine Authority was not successful in the siting process. With the
approval of the Texas Compact, however, the Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority could suspend its search for a
disposal facility location, and was thus disbanded on July 1, 1994.311
Proposed federal legislation ratifying the Texas Compact was introduced before the United States Senate on June 21, 1994,309 but as
303. See P.L. 1987, ch. 530, § 4, repealed by P.L. 1993, ch. 664, § 19.

304. See id.
305. Id.
306. See MB. REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 38, § 1479 (West Supp. 1996-1997).
307. See id. § 1493.
308. See 1993-1994 ME. OFF. OF PuB. Anvoc Am. REP. at 1. See also P.L 1993,
ch. 664, § 19.

309. See 1993-1994 ME.OFF. OF PuB. ADvoc. ANN.REP., supra note 303, at 22.
The bill (identified as S-2222) was cosponsored by senators from Maine and Vermont. The House Bill was cosponsored by Texas representatives, but Maine Representative Olympia Snowe served as lead sponsor. See Id.
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of yet has not been voted into law.3"' Federal legislators are divided
on the issues of whether the Texas Compact satisfies the
LLRWPAA and whether the Compact is good policy for the nation.
Lobbying against the ratification of the Compact are representatives
of many Texans, especially those living in Hudspeth County, who
resent the fact that they are being forced to shoulder the burden of
living near a LLRW disposal facility in which waste from Maine and
Vermont will be dumped. Although Mainers were allowed to vote
on whether to send their waste to another state (the outcome being
fairly predictable), Texans were not given the opportunity to vote on
whether to accept that waste; many Texans feel unfairly put upon by
a state only too willing to take advantage of differing decision-making processes. And many Mainers continue to wonder whether it
will be ethical, or even sensible, to send Maine LLRW to Texas.31 '
1. Positive Aspects of the Texas Compact
There is no doubt that the Texas Compact offers many benefits to
the party states, to Texas itself, and to the nation as a whole. From
Maine's perspective (and Vermont's), perhaps the most important
positive aspect of the Texas Compact is that it represents a longawaited solution to the problem of LLRW disposal. As documented
above, Maine has been searching for a dependable disposal facility
in which to safely dispose of its LLRW since the enactment of the
LLRWPA in 1980. During much of the eighties, Maine seemed destined to remain independent, and had trouble meeting the requirements of the LLRWPAA due to Maine's uncertain future and the
difficulty it was facing in siting a disposal facility within the state.
Had the prospect of the Texas Compact not arisen as the January 1,
1993, cutoff date approached, Maine's LLRW generators would
likely have been in a panic, without a disposal facility to which they
could ship their waste, and without the power, since New York v.
United States, to compel the state to take title to that waste. Instead,
Maine was fairly sure that the Texas Compact would be adopted by
both states, and so it could channel its energy into negotiations
aimed at this potential solution. This was much more politically attractive than continuing the search for a Maine community willing
to host a disposal facility. Thus, the fact that Maine finally has a
"plan" that it can point to is certainly very significant. If the Texas
Compact were ratified by Congress, no longer would Maine be
forced to worry about how it will dispose of its generators' LLRW;
no longer would it be forced to go through a long and painful siting
process, searching for potentially suitable sites, yet suspecting that
310. See ME. OFF. OF PuB. ADVOC., Q. REP. July - Sept. 1996, at 6.

311. See

DELOGU,

supra note 28, at 757 n.11 ("[tihe reader must determine the

ethics of imposing Maine generated wastes ... on the residents of another state").
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ultimately, no matter how suitable the site, the local voters would
reject it.
Another positive aspect of the Texas Compact is the undisputed
fact that, no matter where the facility is ultimately located within
Texas, the physical characteristics of nearly any Texas site are far
superior to any site in Maine. The official NRC guidelines for the
siting of a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility are produced
in the Code of Federal Regulations and provide: "The disposal site
must provide sufficient depth to the water table that ground water
intrusion, perennial or otherwise, into the waste will not occur." "
Past experience teaches that "[t]he three commercial sites closed [in
the seventies] were in the humid region of the country. The technical results and problems at all three sites were similar, in that they
...allowed

water to infiltrate and collect in the trenches." 3 13 Based

on this criteria, it becomes clear that, objectively, it makes more
sense to construct and operate a disposal facility in Texas than in
Maine.
In Texas, the water table is nearly 800 feet down; in Maine
it's closer to three feet. Annual rains amount to about 10 inches in the desert basin; in Maine it's about 40 inches. [In
Texas, r]ain water evaporates long before it can reach the
water table; in Maine it can filter down in as little as a day.314
Although "[s]uch comparisons ... do little for the residents of Sierra

Blanca," 315 it is certain that Texas is the better-suited state to host a
disposal facility.
A positive benefit enjoyed by all three party states and enjoyed
especially by Texas is the fact that, should Congress ratify the Compact, each state will be granted exclusionary authority under the
LLRWPAA; each state can prohibit the import of LLRW across its
borders. InMaine and Vermont, one reason a disposal facility was
never constructed was that as long as each state remained independent there was no guarantee that a facility could be used exclusively
for that state's waste. In Texas, a major concern since the enactment
of the LLRWPA in 1980 and the subsequent decision to construct a
state disposal facility has been whether the state would be able to
312. Disposal Site Suitability Requirements for Land Disposal, 10 C.F.R

§ 61.50(a)(7) (1996).
313. Frank L. Parker, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal,in Low-LEvFl. RADIOACrIVE WASTE R:rGULATION, supra note 2, at 85, 97. See also Jacobs & Rose,
supra note 37, at 65 ("Several of the more serious technical problems in shallow land
burial are related to water management... [qIn humid regions, water levels in the

trenches may rise and come into contact with the waste."); supra notes 52-58 and
accompanying text.
314. Ned Porter, Should Maine Dump Its Nuclear Waste in Texas? Maners
Choose Sides in Compact Debat BANGOR DAILY NEwS,Oct. 25,1993, availablein
1993 WL 10442126.
315. Id.
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confine the use of the facility exclusively to Texas waste.3 16 If Con-

gress ratifies the Texas Compact, Texas will have the authority to
restrict the use of its disposal facility to LLRW generated within
Texas, Maine, and Vermont. Although Texas must accept some outof-state waste under this agreement, Maine and Vermont produce
relatively small amounts of LLRW, and Texas is assured that it will
317
not be forced to accept large amounts of waste from out-of-state.
A final positive aspect of the Texas Compact from a national perspective is that it calls for one disposal facility to be shared by three
states, rather than three disposal facilities, each serving one of the
three states. In 1981, the DOE suggested that six regional facilities
were all that was necessary to serve the nation's disposal needs, and

legislators who passed the 1980 LLRWPA envisioned six or seven
sites across the nation. 318 According to one commentator, since the
early eighties the volume of waste produced by the United States
has decreased by fifty percent. 319 "Correlating the DOE estimates
to this reduced volume, it appears that three LLRW facilities would
serve the country's needs adequately." 20 With nine regional compacts in existence, one compact awaiting ratification, and four remaining independent states, it is conceivable that eventually fifteen
disposal facilities could spring up across the country. 321 This
proliferation

of disposal sites that has occurred

under the

LLRWPAA is a fundamental problem with the federal legislation.
At this point, it is in the nation's best interest to limit the number of
316. See BAR.a:rr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 228.
317. Of course, this argument assumes that Texas will want to limit out-of-state
waste to that produced in Maine and Vermont. Skeptics point out that the Texas
Compact contains provisions allowing the Commission, with a majority vote, to
enter into an agreement with another state or entity for the importation of LLRW
for disposal at the Faskin Ranch site. See Texas Compact, supra note 266, § 3.05(6).
Texas, with a majority of votes in the Compact Commission, effectively controls this
decision, and Compact opponents believe that with the abundance of incentives that
could be offered by states with LLRW disposal shortages, it is only a matter of time
before Faskin Ranch becomes a dumping site for the nation. See Sandra Carreon
Griffin, Editorial,.... But Will Border Become Nation's Dump? AusTIN AMERICANSTATESMAN, May 23, 1994, at All.
318. See BAuLU-rr & STEELE, supra note 7, at 220.
319. Contreras, supra note 7, at 521-22.
320. Id
321. The 15 potential disposal facilities consist of the five independent states
(each with its own disposal facility), plus the nine existing compacts (one of which,
the Northeast Compact, comprised of Connecticut and New Jersey, plans to open
two disposal facilities). See ENGUSH, supra note 41, at 13. Jorge Contreras notes
three major problems associated with a surplus of disposal facilities. First, with too
many sites across the country, individual sites will not receive enough waste to be
able to achieve economies of scale and the resulting cost ultimately charged to generators will be higher. Second, with so many sites across the nation, it is certain that
some sites will be located in areas that are physically inadequate to host a disposal
facility. Third, and probably most obvious, the more sites there are, the more likely
it is that an accident will occur somewhere. Contreras, supra note 7, at 522.
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new facilities to be constructed. Thus, the Texas Compact, which
relieves Maine and Vermont of the duty of building two more facilities, can be looked upon as an agreement that benefits the nation.
2. Negative Aspects of the Texas Compact
a. From Texas's Perspective
From Texas's perspective, there are many negative aspects related
to the Texas Compact, all concerning the siting of the disposal facility in Hudspeth County. Of course, it should again be recognized
that the Texas Compact itself has nothing to say about the siting of
the disposal facility; the decision is left entirely in the hands of the
Texas Legislature. But if the Texas Compact becomes law, it will
follow that the Faskin Ranch site will begin accepting LLRW from
Maine and Vermont, and many argue that the Texas Legislature encouraged and approved use of the Faskin Ranch site in bad faith.
Thus, the problems with how Texas underwent the siting process
must be of concern to Maine, if only because Maine knows that the
people of Hudspeth County do not want Maine's waste to be deposited in their backyard. Mainers should at least recognize the arguments made by those Texas citizens who oppose the siting of a
regional facility in their state, and perhaps this information wil
cause them to reconsider their own position on the Texas Compact.
One major reason many Texans are angry about the siting of a
disposal facility in Hudspeth County is that they were never allowed
to vote directly on the issue, while citizens of Maine were given the
chance to vote, not only against the siting of a facility in their state,
but on whether to send their LLRW to Texas. Texans not only resent the fact that Mainers seemed all too willing to send waste generated in Maine to another state's backyard, but they also resent the
fact that they were not given the chance to voice their opinion on
whether to reject the importation of that waste. Most of the people
of Hudspeth County oppose the Faskin Ranch site. In 1993, a survey by the Texas Authority estimated that sixty-three percent of
Hudspeth County's residents did not want the dump, and some felt
that the estimate was far too low.3' Local opposition to the Faskin
Ranch site was strong at the only public hearing held by the state on
the subject,3" despite critics' observations that "[n]otices of hearings are in English only, while 70 percent of the county's population
is Spanish-speaking."3 '
Politicians and experts debate about whether allowing citizens to
vote on the siting of a LLRW disposal facility is good policy. While
322. See Porter, supra note 314.
323. See id.
324. David Gram, Texas Nuclear Waste Siting Dravs Little ProtestFrom Vermont
Activists, BANGOR DAILY Nnws, Dec. 13, 1993, availablein 1993 WL 6451735.
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some might say that our democratic system mandates that the affected public must be able to vote directly on such important subjects as the siting of a waste disposal facility in their area, others
maintain that allowing such direct public participation does more
harm than good.3" Texas had certainly experienced major difficulties with the NIMBY syndrome in the eighties when it was forced to
reject two proposed sites because of public protest. Therefore, it
might argue, allowing citizens to vote on the siting of a disposal facility could have precluded a site from ever being found. This argument, however, fails to realize that public opposition to the siting of
LLRW disposal facilities stems largely from lack of information and
mistrust of siting authorities. By opening up the process, sharing
information, and providing some forum through which the public
could have expressed its opinion, Texas might have fostered trust
among its citizens. Instead, a chance to vote and most other potential forums for opposing the Faskin Ranch site were effectively foreclosed by the state government, a decision that seems to have fueled
the NIMBY fires in Hudspeth County.
One avenue for voicing opposition to the Faskin Ranch site that
was effectively barred by the Texas government was the alternative
of filing an action in state court for injunctive relief. As noted
above, the Texas Legislature prohibited the filing of a complaint
against the Texas Authority that was related to the siting of a disposal facility in Hudspeth County unless the lawsuit was filed in Travis
County. Travis County is about three hundred miles from Hudspeth
County. The people of Hudspeth County are the most likely parties
who would object to the Faskin Ranch site, but they have little political clout,3 6 little money,327 and little understanding of the judicial
system. They would have enough trouble with the courts in their
own county, but if they wanted to exercise their right to seek judicial
review of the siting process, they were required to find the money
and the means to travel across the state to do so. There is little
325. For example, Richard J. Bord notes that "[p]ublic intervention into decisions concerning risky technologies is generally viewed positively in light of our
democratic norms and the ample history of corporate and government insensitivity
to issues of public health and safety." Richard J. Bord, The Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Crisis: Is More Citizen Participationthe Answer? in Low-Lvm. RADIOAC.
TrVE WAsTE REGULATION, supra note 2, at 193, 193. Yet Bord goes on to discuss
problems with allowing too much public participation in issues such as LLRW disposal. For example, he cites evidence that when commonly misunderstood technology
is at issue, and when the public "perceives a lack of expert consensus about the risks
of that technology," allowing public participation may result in increasing opposition. Richard J. Bord, Problemsin Siting Low-Level RadioactiveWastes: A Focus on
Public Participation,in MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTVE MATERIALS AND WASTES,
supra note 37, at 189, 194.
326. See Maine Nuclear-Waste Export a 'Tough Setback' for Texans, BANGOR
DAmY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1993, availablein 1993 WL 6443892.
327. See Sharp, supra note 262.
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doubt that the Legislature's purpose in requiring lawsuits against the
Authority to be brought on the other side of the state was to silence,
as much as possible, the voices of Hudspeth County's protestors.
The opposition to any LLRW disposal facility is often based on
exaggerations and misperceptions of the risks presented by such a
facility, and the Texas situation is no different. It has already been
noted that living next to a LLRW dump poses less danger than everyday activities such as driving a car or swimming. It has also been
noted, however, that the public's exaggerated fear of anything associated with radioactivity stems partly from the fact that the public
perceives the matter to be out of its hands. The Texas Legislature's
decision to make the filing of a lawsuit against the Texas Authority
almost impossible not only took the LLRW disposal issue out of the
public's hands, it placed it well beyond their grasp. Again, it must
be emphasized that by forcing the Faskin Ranch site on the people
of Hudspeth County without any effective discourse on the subject,
and therefore without consideration of the citizens' views, the Texas
government increased the public's fears and made the problem
worse.

While citizens of Texas have challenged the process by which the
Faskin Ranch facility was sited, so too have they challenged the result that the process reached. In other words, because the siting
process was skewed by political considerations, and because it ignored technical criteria, opponents argue that the site that was ultimately chosen is unsuitable for a LLRW disposal facility. For
example, according to anti-Compact campaigner Bill Addington, a
third-generation resident of Sierra Blanca, "[t]he proposed dump
site sits directly over the West Texas Bolson Aquifer, the sole precious source of drinking water for the entire region."M He continues, "[t]his is very possibly one of the worst places where anyone
3
could propose to bury nuclear waste in the whole state of Texas." 11
In addition, Compact opponents argue that the Hudspeth County
site sits atop a fault line and is prone to earthquakes. 3 They cite a
1931 earthquake measuring 6.0 on the Richter scale that struck Valentine, about sixty miles from Faskin Ranch, and another quake in
1995 measuring 5.6 on the Richter scale that struck Alpine, about
125 miles away, followed about three months later by a 3.5 magnitude aftershock 331 The Texas Authority, however, assures skeptics
that the chances of a major earthquake occurring near the site are
minimal, and that the site will be built using concrete canisters
designed to withstand any quake that could strike the area.?3
328. Porter, supra note 264.
329. Id.

330. See Gamboa, supra note 170.
331. See id.
332. See id

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:515

Another question that has been raised about the siting of the proposed Faskin Ranch disposal facility is whether it was in accordance
with the applicable NRC regulations, with the LLRWPAA guidelines, and with Texas statute. Challengers of the Faskin Ranch site
argue that the decision to put the facility in a 375 square mile section
of Hudspeth County was motivated solely by political reasons rather
than scientific and technological criteria. In effect, the Texas Legislature ignored safety and environmental considerations to site the
facility in an area where the locals would not (or perhaps could not)
object. Bill Addington, campaigning in Maine against the Texas
Compact, argued: "[T]his is a political issue. Science and technology have nothing to do with it.... Politicians picked the site and
then asked scientists to prove it [was suitable]." 3 "3 To support their
contention, opponents merely cite the relevant siting regulations.
The applicable NRC guidelines provide "[tihe primary emphasis in
disposal site suitability is given to isolation of wastes, a matter having long-term impacts, and to disposal site features that ensure that
... long-termperformance standards... aremet, as opposed to short-

term convenience or benefits." 3 The LLRWPAA advises that each
state or region's plan for siting a 33disposal
facility should call for
"screening for broad siting areas." ' 5 And Texas statutes require
the Authority to "determine the areas of the state that are relatively
33 6
more suitable than others for low-level waste disposal activities,,
considering such factors as geology, topography, transportation, access, meteorology, population density, surface and subsurface hydrology, and flora and fauna.3 37

Yet, when the Texas Legislature rejected the Texas Authority's
second recommended location for the proposed disposal facility (the
Fort Hancock site), the Legislature granted the Authority some concessions, including a new statute providing "[n]otwithstanding any
other law or other provision of this chapter, the board shall select as
the disposal site, a site

...

within Hudspeth County, Texas," and

within the 375 square mile boundary. 338 Obviously, this decision
was not based on a finding that the 375 square mile site was better
suited to a disposal facility. It was made long before any siting study
had been done. Instead, it must have been based on a strategic decision; this was the area of the state where political opposition to the
333. John Hale & Ned Porter, Scramble Begins for Votes; Term-Limits Proposal
May Face Tight Race, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 1993, available in 1993 WL
6333320 (alteration in original).
334. Disposal Site Suitability Requirements for Land Disposal, 10 C.F.R.
§ 61.50(a)(1) (1996) (emphasis added).
335. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(B)(iii) (1994) (emphasis added).
336. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 402.081 (West 1992) (emphasis
added).

337. See id. § 402.082.
338. Id- § 402.0921.
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site would be the least. In that respect, the siting procedure certainly violated the spirit of the above cited laws. To use the language provided by the NRC, the Texas Legislature chose short-term
convenience over long-term performance standards. Nevertheless,
when a local group called Alert Citizens for Environmental Safety
filed a lawsuit to make this argument before a Federal District
Court, seeking an injunction to prohibit the construction of a Faskin
Ranch waste dump,339 the court dismissed the complaint in an unpublished opinion.' This decision comes as no surprise because,
realistically, the above-cited statutory language was probably not intended to have any substantive effect. But it should be recognized
that, by choosing the location for its site for political rather than
technical reasons, and by making that choice without regard to the
choice the citizens would have made, Texas lost the trust of the people of Hudspeth County.
Closely related to the problem of siting the facility for political
rather than technical reasons are the charges made by many Faskin
Ranch and Texas Compact opponents that the Texas Authority is
guilty of "environmental racism.' '3 1 Environmental racism can be
defined as "the practice of placing toxic waste and other environmental hazards at sites in neighborhoods primarily populated by
people of color.' 3 This concept is based on studies that show a
pattern of disproportionate concentrations of noxious sites such as
hazardous waste dumps in minority communities.3 3 Hudspeth
County is about seventy percent Hispanic,3" and, as already noted,
a very poor community. In addition to a future LLRW disposal facility at Faskin Ranch, Hudspeth County is also the home of Mile
High Ranch, a dumping ground for New York City Sewage Sludge

339. See Legis. Rec. H-1221-22 (1993) (statement of Rep. Holt). See also Porter,
supra note 314.
340. See 1993-1994 ME. OFF. oF Pun. ADvoc. ANN. RE.R, supra note 303, at 21.

341. See Sharp, supra note 262. Before the 1993 Maine referendum on the Texas
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact, several Maine groups banded to-

gether to campaign against the Compact because of their belief that it promoted
environmental racism. The Center for Vision and Policy, We the People of Maine,

Maine Veterans for Peace, the Committee for a Safe Energy Future, Maine Greens,
Black Education and Cultural History, and the Maine branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People voiced their opposition to the Texas
Compact based on charges of racism. See id,
342. Carolyn M. Mitchell, EnvironmentalRacism" Race as a Primary FactorIn the
Selection of Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 NAt'L BLAcK LJ. 176,176 (1993).
343. See id. at 176-77. See also Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental
Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental

Hazards,63 U. CoLo. L. RFv. 921, 925-27 (1992) ("[T]he findings from these studies
indicate clear and unequivocal... racial biases in the distribution of environmental
hazards.").
344. See Sharp, supra note 262.
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just west of Sierra Blanca.' 5 The political path of least resistance,
taken by the Texas Legislature in siting its LLRW facility, often
leads to communities similar to Sierra Blanca in regions like Hudspeth County.'
Some proponents of the Faskin Ranch site suggest that the promise of future jobs for this poverty-stricken community makes the imminent construction of the disposal facility desirable. The facility
will provide about thirty-five permanent jobs for residents of Hudspeth County, and about one hundred employees will be needed to
construct the facility. 47 Others argue that the promise of jobs is
illusory since locals will be hired for the menial, low-paying, unsteady positions while the real task of managing the facility will be
performed from the city of Austin.'
Furthermore, skeptics note
that "[t]he trade-off between environmental protection and bringing
jobs to an impoverished community has often been labeled 'environmental blackmail.' Industrial polluters and municipalities often join
forces to offer minority, low-income communities the prospects of
jobs if they agree to accept potentially harmful wastes." 349
b. From Maine's Perspective
From Maine's perspective, there are few drawbacks to the Texas
Compact other than the ethical problems associated with sending
radioactive waste to Sierra Blanca. One problem identified by opponents of the Texas Compact is the potentially astronomical "tipping fees" that Maine generators will be forced to pay for each cubic
foot of LLRW they ship the facility. The effect of the LLRWPAA,
as noted above, will be to create anywhere from nine to fifteen
LLRW disposal facilities across the country, when the disposal
needs of the country could probably be met adequately by three
such facilities. 350 Because the same volume of waste will be divided
among this surplus of disposal facilities, it will be impossible for
each facility to achieve an economy of scale making it difficult for
some facilities to cover their fixed costs. Consequently, site opera-

345. See Barry Shlachter, Sewage Sludge From East Coast Finding a Home In
Rural Texas, SAN FRANCISO CHRON., Aug. 16, 1994, at A6.
346. See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 343, at 924 (citing ROBERT D. BULLARD,
DUMPING IN DIxm: RACE, CLAss Am ENViRON mNTAL QUALIT 4 (1990)).

347. See Maine Nuclear-Waste Export a 'Tough Setback' for Texans, supra note
326.
348. See Bryan Woolley, Poor Texas Town Weighing Impact of Dump Site, NEw
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYuNE, Sept. 29, 1996, at A16.
349. Mitchell, supra note 342, at 178.
350. See Contreras, supra note 7, at 521-22. But see Garnboa, supra note 170
(attributing increased tipping fees to excess demand).
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tors will be forced to charge high tipping fees on the minimal volume they receive. 351
Present tipping fees have increased from ten dollars per cubic foot
to about three hundred to four hundred dollars per cubic foot.3 2 It
has been estimated that the Faskin Ranch facility, accepting waste
from only three states, two of which are relatively small waste-producers, will be forced to charge about four hundred and fifty dollars
for every cubic foot of LLRW it accepts.353 Critics of the Texas
Compact argue that this fee is far too much to impose on Maine's
generators. But these critics fail to recognize that, at present, Maine
generators are without a disposal facility at any price. Three to four
hundred dollars per cubic foot is the going rate for LLRW disposal
under the LLRWPAA, and if Maine was not a member of the Texas
Compact, it would probably still be paying that amount. The expense is unavoidable.
The other main problem with the Texas Compact, from Maine's
point of view, is that it may not provide adequate disposal capacity
for the volumes of waste that will be generated when Maine Yankee
shuts down in 2008 (or sooner"). As noted above, when a nuclear
power plant shuts down, much of the actual structure and equipment becomes "decommissioning waste" which must be disposed of
in a LLRW disposal facility. Maine Yankee has planned to implement prompt dismantlement when it shuts down, a process that
would create about 480,000 cubic feet of decommissioning waste
before the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. 55
Under the Texas Compact, the Compact Commission has allotted
Maine 300,000 cubic feet of disposal space, 6 enough for the traditional commercial LLRW produced by Maine, but obviously insufficient to absorb the tremendous amount of LLRW that will be
produced by the decommissioning of Maine Yankee.
Yet prompt dismantlement is not the only method of dealing with
decommissioning waste open to Maine Yankee. Maine Yankee has
considered entombment, which would involve sealing the entire
351. See Contreras, supra note 7, at 522. Since most of the costs of operating a
disposal facility arise from factors that are relatively independent of the size of the
facility or the amount of waste it accepts (such as the costs of site characterization
and development, environmental studies, and monitoring), the fixed costs of operat-

ing a small facility are about the same as the fixed costs of operating a large facility.
Therefore, in order to make the same return on the investment, a small facility will
be forced to charge tipping fees well in excess of those charged by a large facility.

See id.
352. See Gamboa, supra note 170.
353. See Legis. Rec. H-1222 (1993) (statement of Rep. Holt).
354. See supra notes 16 and 18.

355. See ToWARD ABETMR UmNERsrAnINo, supra note 20, at 8. For an explanation of prompt dismantlement, see supra note 20.
356. See Legis. Rec. H-1222 (1993) (statement of Rep. Holt).
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power plant from the environment by filling it with concrete. 5 7
This method would conserve Maine's allocated space at the Faskin
Ranch site for commercial waste, and avoid the safety and health
risks, as well as the costs, of dismantling the plant and shipping its
radioactive parts across the country to Texas.358 Another option
open to Maine Yankee when the power plant is finally shut down
permanently is to seal the plant from the environment for a safestore period of sixty years, giving Maine until 2068 to find a place to
dispose of the decommissioning waste.359 Another benefit of the
safestore period is that it allows the decommissioning waste to decay
during the sixty year period to much safer levels of radioactivity,
making the dismantling and shipment of the plant's parts and equip3 60
ment much less dangerous to the workers and to the public.
These alternatives to "prompt dismantlement" make arguments that
the Texas Compact be rejected due to insufficient space largely
moot.
c. From the Nation's Perspective

From the perspective of the nation, there are several negative aspects related to the Texas Compact. The first problem is not directly
with the Compact itself, but again with the siting of the Texas facility. The designation of the Faskin Ranch site as the future location
of a LLRW disposal facility is seen by many as "in flagrant disregard
of the avowed goals of the 1983 La Paz Agreement."3161 Signed in
1983 at La Paz, Baja California, Mexico, the La Paz Agreement between the United States and Mexico provides for cooperation between the two nations in protecting and improving the environment
surrounding their shared border.
According to the terms of the
Agreement, the "border area" refers to the area one hundred kilometers on either side of the boundary between Mexico and the
United States 63 The Faskin Ranch site is approximately thirty-two
kilometers from the Mexican border.3 4
Article Two of the La Paz Agreement provides that the two nations will "to the fullest extent practical,.., adopt the appropriate
measures to prevent, reduce and eliminate sources of pollution in
357. See TOWARD A BETTER UNDER TANIno,
358. See i&.

supra note 20, at 8.

359. See ia
360. See id.
361. Griffin, supra note 317, at All.
362. See Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in
the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., 22 I.L.M. 1025 [hereinafter La Paz
Agreement].
363. See d, art. IV, at 1027.
364. See Concerns Arise Over Mexican & U.S. Government Plans to Construct
Disposal Sites for Hazardous Waste Near Border, SOURCEMEX EcoN. NEWS &
ANALYSIS ON MEX., July 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7994071.
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their respective territory which affect the border area of the
other.' ' 65 Article Seven provides that they will "assess, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective national laws, regulations
and policies, projects that may have significant impacts on the environment of the border area, so that appropriate measures may be
considered to avoid or mitigate adverse environmental effects."'
Although it is unclear whether allowing Texas to construct a disposal facility in Hudspeth County would technically violate the La Paz
agreement, Mexico has protested the siting decision.367 Nonetheless, while the siting of the disposal facility may violate this agreement, it must be repeated that the Texas Compact does not refer to
the siting of the facility, other than to say that it is a separate issue in
the hands of the host state. Therefore, this is an issue between the
federal government and the state of Texas. International tension between Mexico and the United States is simply another unfortunate
result of a poor siting process by the state of Texas.
National commentators have also criticized the Texas Compact
because it joins three states that do not share a common border, one
of which is in the southwest and two of which are in New England.
These critics have therefore charged that the Compact clearly violates the policy of the LLRWPAA that "the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste can be most safely and effectively managed on a
regional basis." 3 The term "regional" is conspicuously absent
from the definitions offered in the LLRWPAA, so it is unclear
whether Congress intended this adjective to be a substantive mandate allowing only compacts between neighboring states, or whether
it was simply intended to mean "more than one state." 369 But opponents argue that the intent of Congress when it enacted the
LLRWPAA was to encourage neighboring states in distinct areas of
the country to form compacts, envisioning six or seven compacts,
made up of states in close geographic proximity to each other.37
Even if this was the intent of Congress when it drafted the bill,
however, one might argue that the failure to make this intent explicit forecloses the "regional" argument from being used to deny
Congressional ratification to a group of states that have otherwise
365. La Paz Agreement, supra note 362, art. II,at 1026.

366. Id. art. VII, at 1027-28.
367. See 141 CONG. REac. H9110 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1995) (unofficial translation

of communication from the Mexican Government to U.S. State Department).
368. 42 U.S.C § 2021d(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
369. Probably the closest the LLRVPAA comes to defining "regional"

is its definition of "compact region," which is defined as "the area consisting of all States that
are members of a compact." I&.§ 2021b(6). This seems to imply that the intent of
the drafters was to encourage states in one "area" to form compacts. This is, however, not the only fair reading of the definition, which was certainly never intended
to supply the answer to this question.
370. See BARU.rr & SEPLE, supra note 7,at 220.
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complied with the LLRWPAA. Those who make this argument
point out that Congress has already given its approval to one compact in which not all the member states shared a common border:
The Northeast Compact, when it was ratified, consisted of New
Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and the nearby state of Connecticut.
They further point out that perhaps the flexibility provided by the
omission of a definition of "regional" should be recognized as a positive benefit that allows states without physical characteristics suitable for a safe, efficient LLRW disposal facility to compact with a
state with more suitable characteristics. Proponents of the Texas
Compact argue that Maine and other New England states are generally unsuitable for disposing of LLRW because of their high rainfall,
high water table, and dense populations. Therefore, the federal legislation should provide the flexibility for such states to form compacts with more suitable western states such as Texas.
Of course, compliance with the Texas Compact, because of its
"non-regional" nature, will involve shipping the LLRW of Maine
and Vermont across a large portion of the country. Therefore, some
would argue that whatever measure of safety is gained by allowing
the facility to be located in a dry, sparsely-populated state is offset
by citizens, mostly residents of non-party states, being put at risk by
potential shipping mishaps. Balancing the relative risks of shipping
LLRW across great distances against depositing LLRW in potentially unsafe disposal facilities obviously involves more speculation
than certainty. We know that since the early sixties, the beginning
of the era of commercial LLRW disposal, any LLRW produced in
Maine must have been shipped across the country through "innocent" states. Soon after Maine Yankee began operations in 1972
(thus producing Maine's first significant amounts of LLRW), three
out of the four closest commercial disposal facilities closed, 371 requiring Maine generators' LLRW to be shipped at least as far as
South Carolina. One study estimated that one in every 250,000 interstate shipments of commodities involve some sort of radioactive
material; 37 but, since 1971, the DOE has only documented 545 accidents in which any radioactive material was released.373 We also
know that the three sites that were forced to close in the seventies
did so largely because of problems with water management in a humid climate. 374 Although Maine has outlawed SLB for any disposal
facilities that might be located within the state, other methods of
371. As noted above, New York's West Valley site closed in 1975, Kentucky's
Maxey Flats site closed in 1977, and Illinois's Sheffield site closed in 1978. See supra
notes 51-58 and accompanying text. Thus, the facility closest to Maine since the
seventies has been South Carolina's Barnwell site.
372. See GERsHEY F-T AL., supra note 5, at 69.
373. See Petrella, supra note 60, at 135.
374. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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disposal may be just as risky.'7t Therefore, the best solution may be
to opt for risk in the short term, shipping Maine waste to Texas in
order to ensure safety in the long term by using the best-suited facility for disposal. But in the end, as with nearly every issue of LLRW
disposal, it is a matter of weighing the risks and choosing the option
that everyone can live with.
D. Future Prospectsfor the Texas Compact
The Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act was introduced before the United States Senate on June 21,
1994.376 The same legislation was introduced before the House of
Representatives on July 20, 1994. 77 Since the nine previous compacts had been ratified with little debate, one may have assumed
that Congress would quickly approve the Compact. Although some
problems concerning state siting issues might have existed, Texas,
Maine, and Vermont felt they had complied with the requirements
of the Federal Act, and therefore expected that their interstate compact would be ratified. On September 19, 1995, however, the Texas
Compact Consent Act was defeated by a 243 to 176 vote in the
House of Representatives.3 78 The brief debate that was held on the
proposed legislation the day before the vote provides some insight
on the reasons for the bill's defeat.
A few representatives recognized that "[t]he responsibility of
Congress in approving the compact is fairly simple. If the Texas
compact complies with underlying requirements of the Low-level
Radioactive Waste Act, Congress must grant approval to the compact."3 7 9 And some also recognized that Congress should not "arbitrate over local issues such as site selection. That is a matter for the
States, and it would be intrusive of us to assume the authority unto
ourselves." 3" Nonetheless, it would seem that many who voted
against the Texas Compact were swayed by arguments concerning
the site of the facility, an issue that has nothing to do with the Texas
Compact itself. Opponents argued that the site in Texas would violate the La Paz Agreement 1 that the Faskin County site was un375. See Gamboa, supra note 170 (quoting Tbxas's Low Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Authority civil engineer Ruben Alvarado: "When you put something on
top of the ground, you get in competition with Mother Nature-rainstorms, floods,

tornados, [and] wear and tear.").
376. See S. 2222, 103d Cong. (1994).
377. See H.R. 4800, 103d Cong. (1994).
378. See 141 CONG. Rc. H-9153 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995).
379. 141 CONG. REc. 9107 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Schaefer).

380. Id. at H9113 (statement of Rep. Fields).
381. See iULat H9110 (statement of Rep. Coleman). Representative Coleman
stated:
RThe citizens and Government of Mexico are concerned about the threat

to their environment from this disposal site. While Congress claims it may
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safe because of a propensity for earthquakes, 3 1 and that the people
of Texas objected to the site but were unable to vote on the issue.383
The last argument led to an interesting proposal by the Representative whose congressional district included the Faskin Ranch site:
I believe that [the LLRWPAA] should be amended, actually
to include the input from local constituents ....
Although the States have control in determining site selection, today, we in Congress can give my constituents a voice by
voting "no" on this measure and demanding that the process
be amended to consider local rights. 3 4
This suggestion perceptively recognized that the problems attributed
to the Texas Compact may be a result of the underlying federal
legislation.
The final argument that was given particular emphasis before the
House of Representatives was that the Compact allowed the Compact Commission to agree to import out-of-state waste from nonmember states; Texas Representatives apparently assumed that
given this opportunity, the economic incentives offered by parties
desperate to find a place to dispose of their LLRW would cause the
Commission to allow Texas to become the "dumping ground" for
the nation. 3 5 Like the decision concerning where and how to site
the disposal facility, however, the drafting and interpretation of the
Compact itself is properly an area left to the states and not subject
to Congressional second-guessing.
Although the Compact was defeated in the House in 1995, its proponents have not given up hope that it will eventually be ratified.
Lobbyists from Maine, Texas, and Vermont have been canvassing
Washington, concentrating particularly on "House Staffers for U.S.
Representatives who voted against the Compact on September 19[,
have no authority over the site selection process, we are responsible for
guaranteeing that our binational agreements are respected by our own citizens, as well as by our State governments.
Id
382. See id at H9109 (statement of Rep. Coleman) ("I ask you, why would anyone deliberately dispose of such volatile materials in an area known for its seismic
activity?"). Id
383. See id
Do not think that all Texans are in agreement on this compact. Unlike
the citizens of Maine, the people of Texas were never provided the opportunity to vote on whether or not they approve of a compact. The very
people who have endangered their lives by accepting the wastes of other
States, the people of Texas, had no say in the decision. If it was good
enough for the people of Maine, it should have been good enough for the
people of Texas.
Id
384. Id at H9108 (statement of Rep. Bonilla).
385. Id at H9114 (statement of Rep. Doggett).
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1995]." 38 Maine's Public Advocate, Stephen Ward, is among those
lobbying the Washington legislators, and his office "continuef] to
believe that Congress will eventually approve the Compact. " V
Additional debates in the House have emphasized some of the
problems that have resulted in votes against the Compact, and illustrated that the Representatives were focusing on siting issues not
properly before them. s One Representative stated that he would
"offer an amendment to provide that if [the Compact] is approved,
[the disposal facility] cannot be located in a seismicaUy active area
.... ,389 Such an amendment, however, would clearly infringe upon
Texas's responsibility and authority under the LLRWPAA to provide for the disposal of its LLRW. The problems inherent in the
siting of the facility, such as the allegation that the Faskin Ranch is
located atop an active seismic fault, are properly left to Texas and
the NRC-they have nothing to do with the Texas Compact.
Another interesting proposal made by the same Representative
would infringe on state sovereignty in a different manner, he stated
that he would offer an additional amendment to the Compact which
would prohibit the importation of out-of-state waste into Texas from
any other state but Maine or Vermont? 9 By doing so, he sought to
guarantee that the Compact Commission could not be bought by a
desperate state such as Connecticut, which had previously offered
$100 million to the state of Texas in return for membership in the
Compact.391 Of course, such an amendment would be a clear violation of the LLRWPAA's grant of power to the states to "enter into
such compacts
as may be necessary" to safely and effectively dispose
392
of LLRW.
The discussions in the House of Representatives, however, are illustrative of the possibility that the Compact might not be ratified
without substantive amendments. On the other hand, it is equally
possible that the real problem lies not with the Compact, but with
the federallegislation; indeed, when the Texas Compact arrives back
before Congress it will be completely unchanged, leading to the conclusion that its proponents believe its problems have their roots
elsewhere.
386. Mn. OF. oF Pm. Anvoc., Q. REP., supra note 310, at 6.
387. Id.
388. See 141 CONG. REC. H15248 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Coleman). Representative Coleman stated:

So what if it is out in west Texas, in a poor little old town called Sierra
Blanca; right? It is not in... Houston, TX, or up near Dallas. No, it is just
out in west Texas. So who cares, other than those 900 people that live in
that county. Who cares?
Id.
389. Id. at H15250 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
390. See id. at H15249 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
391. See Ward, supra note 254.

392. 42 U.S.C § 2021d(a)(2) (1994).
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E. Possible Improvements in the Texas Compact
The only criticism of the Texas Compact that goes directly to the
Compact itself is that it may result in risk to the nation's citizens
because it involves shipments of LLRW between "non-regional"
member states. As discussed above, however, it should be evident
that allowing a compact between non-member states can also avoid
the risks inherent in siting a disposal facility in the wet and cold
climate of New England. The arguments that the Texas Compact
will shackle Maine with high costs but not enough disposal capacity
are misleading because Maine would be forced to pay high prices for
LLRW disposal whether it was a member of the Texas Compact or
not. Also, it should be recognized that the Texas Compact gives
Maine more disposal capacity than it would have otherwise. If plans
for the Texas Compact were abandoned, Maine would be forced to
revert back to a search for a suitable in-state location for a disposal
facility, a search that in the past "cost more than $4 million and engendered strong opposition from residents of communities that
made the short list."3 93

As noted above, however, most of the major problems cited by
critics of the Texas Compact are not problems with the Compact
itself, but problems with the siting process employed by the State of
Texas in choosing the Faskin Ranch site. These problems include
the following: First, the process of siting the facility purposely
sought to exclude the people of Texas from voicing their opinion on
the matter, whether through voting in a referendum, as required in
Maine, or by filing a civil action to challenge the methods by which
the facility was sited. Second, the method by which the facility was
sited was, itself, flawed. By defining the area in which the site was
located before any scientific studies were performed to judge
whether that area was, in fact, suitable, the Texas Legislature almost
surely violated state and national rules for the siting of a LLRW
facility. Third, by choosing an area in which seventy percent of the
population is Hispanic, and by further circumscribing their already
limited access to forums in which to speak out, the Texas Legislature
may be guilty of "environmental racism." Finally, the siting of the
facility at Faskin Ranch in Hudspeth County has been interpreted
by the Mexican Government as a possible violation of the 1983 La
Paz Agreement. The argument that the Hudspeth County site is unsuitable for LLRW disposal because of the danger of earthquakes
may have some merit as well.
The arguments noted above concern the siting of the facility, however, and thus do not provide any basis for supporting or objecting
to the Texas Compact itself. It should now be clear that the Texas
Compact gives Texas the authority to "develop and have full admin393. Porter, supra note 314.
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istrative control over the development, management and operation"
of the LLRW disposal facility. 3 4 Also, the LLRWPAA gives each
state the responsibility "for providing.., for the disposal of... lowlevel radioactive waste generated within the State ....,9 Thus,
critics of the Texas Compact who charge that the Compact is flawed
because of siting problems should point their fingers elsewhere. The
issue of siting the facility should be left to be resolved by Texas and
the NRC.
While it is true that the Texas Compact does not specify the location of the disposal facility and that choosing the location is solely
the decision of the state of Texas, one may still wonder whether this
explanation is adequate justification for Maine. While perhaps Congress cannot refuse to ratify the Compact based on Texas's siting
process, can Maine join the Compact and send its LLRW to this
disposal facility, which is located in a poor minority community,
with a clear conscience? It has been argued in this Comment and
elsewhere that Texas has already "made the ironclad decision that
[the Faskin Ranch] site is going to be used, whether this compact
passes or not,"3 96 but perhaps that does not preclude Maine from
negotiating with Texas to gain some input into the siting process.
Might Maine insist that Texas begin its siting process anew, this time
with the advice of its compact member states?
However attractive this possibility might be to Mainers who question their state's membership in the Texas Compact, it is almost certainly out of the question. Under the LLRWPAA, the siting of the
facility in Texas is a decision solely for Texas to make. Thus, it
would be improper for Maine to make such a suggestion. If the citizens of Maine object to the agreement that allows Maine generators
to ship LLRW to the Faskin Ranch site, they must be prepared to
deal with the LLRW themselves, for the only solution is to withdraw
from the Texas Compact itself. As noted above, this decision would
necessitate that the complex, controversial, and expensive procedure of siting a facility in Maine start again from scratch.
IV.

CONCLUSION--SoLuriON?

The problems that should make Maine hesitate before sending its
LLRW to Texas are not problems with the Texas Compact itself.
Indeed, a careful analysis of the Texas Compact shows that it comports in every respect with the LLRWPAA. The problems that
should trouble Maine (and Congress) are a direct result of the federal legislation under which the Compact was enacted. The federal
legislation encourages fictional alliances, such as that between Connecticut and New Jersey, in which each state will host its own dispo394. Texas Compact, supra note 266, § 4.01 (emphasis added).
395. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A) (1994).
396. 141 CONG. REc. H15251 (Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields).
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sal facility, yet is allowed exclusionary authority because of its

"compact membership." The federal legislation ignores the actual
siting of disposal facilities, allowing states such as Texas to place facilities in areas such as Hudspeth County. The federal legislation
may result in as many as fifteen disposal sites across the country, or,
even worse, its result may be that no disposal sites will ever be
agreed upon. It is the LLRWPAA that should be amended, or perhaps completely repealed.
As this Comment has shown, the states have faced substantial
problems in implementing the mandates of the LLRWPA and its
1985 amendments. It should be noted that of the nine compacts in
existence today, none has made any significant progress towards siting a facility in which to dispose of the LLRW they produce. 397 As a
matter of fact, the facility in Texas may be the first new LLRW disposal facility to open in the United States since the Barnwell, South
Carolina site opened in 1971.398 Also, as noted above, while the nation probably only needs about two or three sites for safe, economical disposal of its LLRW, the LLRWPAA could potentially result in
fifteen disposal sites being put into operation at once. This result, of
course, means incredibly high costs of disposal and increased risk of
an accident.
This Comment will not attempt to suggest changes in the
LLRWPAA. It may be that the federal government should assume
responsibility for the disposal of LLRW, setting up a few disposal
facilities on federal land and monitoring the disposal itself. This
proposal was met with fierce opposition when it was suggested in
the late seventies, however, and the reaction may be the same today.
Also, the federal government has been unsuccessful in finding a permanent repository for the nation's HLRW, so one might wonder
why its prospects for success with LLRW should be any different.
But it cannot be disputed that the states have failed to provide for
the disposal of the LLRW they produce, and thus have created a
national problem.
As for the Texas Compact, there is no legal reason why it should
be rejected. It has its weaknesses, but it also has significant benefits.
It is not perfect, but it may be as close to perfection as our state can
come. The only reason to oppose the Texas Compact is borne out of
a sense of moral responsibility, a choice that each Maine citizen
must make individually. As for the nation, we must realize that with
the benefits of nuclear power and other uses of radioactive material,
comes radioactive waste. Congress must reexamine the nation's
policy with respect to LLRW, and must acknowledge that the deadline by which each state was to have assumed responsibility for its
LLRW has come and gone without a single new disposal facility
397. See Gamboa, supra note 170.

398. See id.
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opening. It is time to put an end to the LLRW disposal problem
that has plagued the nation for so many years.
Maxwell Branson

